“…In those circumstances, individuals may suspend judgment and be quick to engender alternatives to any emergent view. (p. 264) The closedness for new information and evidence is one of the most important implications of need for closure theory, and has been illustrated by a lowered sensitivity to alternative hypotheses (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1988) and preference for simplified judgment (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003a;Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), but also by a higher resistance to persuasion (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), and a less extensive search for information (Ellis, 1996;Klein & Webster, 2000;Kruglanski, Peri, & Zakai, 1991;Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). Moreover, need for closure has also been shown to influence a variety of classic social cognitive phenomena such as the impressional primacy effect (Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985;Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991;Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;Webster & Kruglanski, 1994;Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996), recency effects (Richter & Kruglanski, 1998), construct accessibility effects (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995), the mere exposure effect (Kruglanski, Freund, & Bar-Tal, 1996), the overattribution bias (Webster, 1993), conformity pressure (De Dreu, 2003), and the use of cognitive heuristics such as numerical anchoring (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).…”