Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest

Mercier, Jean‐François

doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0610-x

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Dickson,MacKenzie,andSekeris(2018)analyzehowscarcer rentsmaybecomemorecontested. Mercier(2018)enablesacontestdesignertochooseasubsetof contestantsforprofitmaximization.…”

Section: Various Other Kinds Of Contestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Review of Axioms for Group Contest Success Functions

Hausken

2022

International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences

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Axioms are reviewed for group contest success functions for general production functions, focusing particularly on the additive production function and the multiplicative Cobb-Douglas production function. With one minor exception, these axioms already exist in the literature. This article clarifies which axioms apply and how they apply for group contest success functions. Essential for axioms satisfied by the additive production function, driven by substitutability across efforts, is the sufficiency of only one group member exerting effort. Essential for axioms satisfied by the multiplicative production function, driven by complementarity across efforts, is that all group members exert efforts. The additive production function satisfies an axiom where adding an amount to one effort and subtracting the same amount from a second equivalent substitutable effort does not change the winning probabilities. The Cobb-Douglas production function satisfies a strong homogeneity axiom where an equiproportionate change in matched group member’s efforts does not affect the winning probabilities.

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“…Dickson,MacKenzie,andSekeris(2018)analyzehowscarcer rentsmaybecomemorecontested. Mercier(2018)enablesacontestdesignertochooseasubsetof contestantsforprofitmaximization.…”

Section: Various Other Kinds Of Contestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Review of Axioms for Group Contest Success Functions

Hausken

2022

International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences

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“…Dickson et al (2018) assess how rents may become more strongly contested when they become scarcer. Mercier (2018) develops a revelation mechanism where a contest designer selects a subset of contestants to maximize his profits.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Axiomatizing additive multi-effort contests

Hausken

2021

SN Bus Econ

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A rent seeking model is axiomatized where players exert multiple additive efforts which are substitutable in the contest success function. The axioms assume the sufficiency of exerting one effort, and that adding an amount to one effort and subtracting the same amount from a second equivalent substitutable effort keeps the winning probabilities unchanged. In contrast, the multiplicative Cobb–Douglas production function in the earlier literature requires players to exert all their complementary efforts. The requirement follows from assuming a homogeneity axiom where an equiproportionate change in two players’ matched efforts does not affect the winning probabilities. This article abandons the homogeneity axiom and assumes an alternative axiom where the winning probabilities remain unchanged when a fixed positive amount is added to all players’ efforts. This article also assumes a so-called summation axiom where the winning probabilities remain unchanged when a player substitutes an amount of effort from one effort into another effort. The summation axiom excludes multiplicative production functions, and furnishes a foundation for additive production functions.

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Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest

Cited by 2 publications

References 16 publications

A Review of Axioms for Group Contest Success Functions

A Review of Axioms for Group Contest Success Functions

Axiomatizing additive multi-effort contests

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