Seismological Methods for Monitoring a CTBT: The Technical Issues Arising in Early Negotiations

Richards, Paul G.; Zavales, John

doi:10.1007/978-94-011-0419-7_5

Cited by 12 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(20 reference statements)

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“…According to Richards & Zavale (1996), Romney's estimate turned out to be far off the mark. Later calculations have determined the number of indistinguishable events in USSR and China to be approximately zero per year.…”

Section: Seismographs As Diplomatic Objects In Nuclear Testmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The seismograph as a diplomatic object: The S oviet– A merican exchange of instruments, 1958–1964

2021

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Scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain met in Geneva in 1958 and 1959 to create the technical basis for monitoring a future nuclear test ban treaty. Despite their scientific veneer, these meetings were politically motivated and the scientists tried to forward U.S. or Soviet objectives through their technical discussions. Seismographic data was a cornerstone of the proposed monitoring regime, but when the discussions became political, so too did the instruments that produced the scientific data. Thus, seismographs became diplomatic objects used to support or challenge foreign policy objectives. After the collapse of the scientific meetings, the US distributed seismographs as diplomatic gifts to create a worldwide, U.S.‐controlled nuclear‐detection network in 1960. To exploit data from the network without supporting U.S. policy objectives, the USSR in 1961 proposed to exchange U.S. seismographs for Soviet ones, as two objects of equal value. That allowed each superpower to access the other's technology without creating bonds of mutual obligations. However, this type of inverted, object‐based diplomacy also gave scientists from international scientific organisations or small, non‐nuclear nations like Denmark a way to engage in nuclear diplomacy. When Danish scientists offered to create a connection station between the U.S. and Soviet seismic networks, they did so in full agreement with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to strengthen their policy of nuclear disarmament independently of U.S. objectives.

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Section: Seismographs As Diplomatic Objects In Nuclear Testmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 Adamson & Lalli (2021); Jacobsen & Ols akov a (2021); Ito & Rentetzi (2021). 8 Richards & Zavale (1996); Romney (2009). 9 For more on seismology, diplomacy, and the military, see Barth (1998;; Doel (2010); Greene (2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The seismograph as a diplomatic object: The S oviet– A merican exchange of instruments, 1958–1964

2021

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“…Initial results were not encouraging. However, clear P signals were seen by an experimental seismometer array deployed in Wyoming, United States, from presumed underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) in Kazakhstan and Algeria, leading to the realization that signals detected at large distances, i.e., 3000-10,000 km, from the source (known as teleseismic signals) could be used for discrimination (Richards & Zavales 1996, Douglas 2007. The main teleseismic discriminants that emerged from subsequent research are source depth, P complexity (simplicity), and the ratio of body-to surface-wave magnitude (m b :M s ).…”

Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 99%

Forensic Seismology and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Bowers

Selby

2009

Annu. Rev. Earth Planet. Sci.

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One application of forensic seismology is to help verify compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. One of the challenges facing the forensic seismologist is to discriminate between the many thousands of earthquakes of potential interest each year and potential Treaty violations (underground explosions). There are four main methods: (a) ratio of bodyto surface-wave magnitudes, (b) ratio of high-frequency P to S energy, (c) model-based methods, and (d) source depth. Methods (a) and (b) have an empirical basis. The weakness of methods (a)-(c) is the lack of an equivalent elastic source for an underground explosion fired in the range of geological media found around the world. Reliable routine source-depth determination has proved difficult. However, experience gained in the past decade at identifying suspicious seismic sources suggests that although no single method works all of the time, intelligent and original application of complementary methods is usually sufficient to satisfactorily identify the source in question.

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“…In 1963 there was a perception, influential in some forums, that seismological methods for monitoring underground nuclear explosions were inadequate -a view that helped to prevent the conclusion of a CTBT in this early period (Richards and Zavales, 1996). The text of the CTBT approved by the United Nations in 1996 is about fifty times longer than the text of the LTBT of 1963, in large part because of the extensive provisions (in the 1996 CTBT) for verification.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Seismological Methods for Monitoring a CTBT: The Technical Issues Arising in Early Negotiations

Cited by 12 publications

References 18 publications

The seismograph as a diplomatic object: The S oviet– A merican exchange of instruments, 1958–1964

The seismograph as a diplomatic object: The S oviet– A merican exchange of instruments, 1958–1964

Forensic Seismology and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

24 Seismological methods of monitoring compliance with the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty

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