Seeing Where We're at

Rice, Heather J.

doi:10.1002/9781444328202.ch10

Cited by 31 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 107 publications

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“…When remembering an event, but not knowledge, a perspective is taken to organize the scene. In practice, people are often not sure of the location from which they are viewing their memory and can change that location, but they agree they are viewing it from some point in space (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005; Rice, 2010; Rice & Rubin, 2011). Therefore, whether you are able to conjure a first- or third-person view of the to-be-remembered information is one criterion for an event memory; the particular perspective does not matter, only that you have one.…”

Section: Replacing a Sense Of Reliving With The Mental Construction O...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events.

Rubin

Umanath

2015

Psychological Review

303

247

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An event memory is a mental construction of a scene recalled as a single occurrence. It therefore requires the hippocampus and ventral visual stream needed for all scene construction. The construction need not come with a sense of reliving or be made by a participant in the event, and it can be a summary of occurrences from more than one encoding. The mental construction, or physical rendering, of any scene must be done from a specific location and time; this introduces a ‘self’ located in space and time, which is a necessary, but need not be a sufficient, condition for a sense of reliving. We base our theory on scene construction rather than reliving because this allows the integration of many literatures and because there is more accumulated knowledge about scene construction’s phenomenology, behavior, and neural basis. Event memory differs from episodic memory in that it does not conflate the independent dimensions of whether or not a memory is relived, is about the self, is recalled voluntarily, or is based on a single encoding with whether it is recalled as a single occurrence of a scene. Thus, we argue that event memory provides a clearer contrast to semantic memory, which also can be about the self, be recalled voluntarily, and be from a unique encoding; allows for a more comprehensive dimensional account of the structure of explicit memory; and better accounts for laboratory and real world behavioral and neural results, including those from neuropsychology and neuroimaging, than does episodic memory.

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Section: Replacing a Sense Of Reliving With The Mental Construction O...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events.

Rubin

Umanath

2015

Psychological Review

303

247

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“…Thus, egocentric perspective is like a window from which we view the past, and the location of this window influences what we see in our minds eye and how memory content is organized (Bryne, Becker, & Burgess, 2007;Rubin & Umanath, 2015). Much cognitive research has examined how the viewpoint people adopt influences how people remember and describe their memories (for reviews see Eich et al, 2011;Rice, 2010;St. Jacques, 2021).…”

Section: How Visual Perspective Reshapes Memoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perspective Matters: When Visual Perspective Reshapes Autobiographical Memories

Jacques¹

2023

Preprint

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Memories are not accurate records of the past, but instead reflect our unique point-of-view. Not only do we experience events from a particular visual perspective, we can also retrieve events from one of two perspectives: 1) an own eyes perspective, from the same viewpoint where the event was initially experienced, and 2) an observer-like perspective, where we might “see” ourselves in the remembered event. The particular visual perspective adopted, as well as the ability to shift between perspectives, is associated with changes in the subjective and objective characteristics of memories, which has led to debate regarding whether the presence of novel perspectives reflects inaccuracies or distortions. In this target article I will provide an overview of cognitive research on visual perspective in memories for events by discussing the circumstances in which adopting an observer-like perspective signals changes in memories that impact their veridicality and the legal applications to eyewitness testimony.

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“…Most extant studies that seek to understand how the self is represented in episodic simulation have focused on visual perspectives (Nigro & Neisser 1983;Rice 2010;Sutin & Robins 2008). Either a field or an observer perspective can be adopted in imagination, remembering or future thinking.…”

Section: Visual Perspectives and The Sense Of Self In Episodic Simulation: Variety And Limitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We currently cannot exclude the possibility that there are other factors that may influence how one identifies with oneself in observer-perspective imagination. While the content of memory can affect the visual perspective adopted (Rice 2010) and the location of the vantage point of the observer perspective (Rice & Rubin 2011), theoretically, these factors may also influence identification.…”

Section: Identification In Observer-perspective Imaginationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The variety and limits of self-experience and identification in imagination

Lin

Dranseika

2021

Synthese

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Imagination and other forms of mental simulation allow us to live beyond the current immediate environment. Imagination that involves an experience of self further enables one to incorporate or utilize the contents of episodic simulation in a way that is of importance to oneself. However, the simulated self can be found in a variety of forms. The present study provides some empirical data to explore the various ways in which the self could be represented in observer-perspective imagination as well as the potential limits on such representations. In observer-perspective imagination, the point of view or perspective is dissociated from the location of one's simulated body. We have found that while there are different ways to identify with oneself in an observer-perspective imagination, the identification is rarely dissociated from first-person perspective in imagination. Such variety and limits pave the way for understanding how we identify with ourselves in imagination. Our results suggest that the first-person perspective is a strong attractor for identification. The empirical studies and analysis in this paper demonstrate how observer-perspective episodic simulation serves as a special case for research on identification in mental simulation, and similar methods can be applied in the studies of memory and future thinking.

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Seeing Where We're at

Cited by 31 publications

References 107 publications

Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events.

Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events.

Perspective Matters: When Visual Perspective Reshapes Autobiographical Memories

The variety and limits of self-experience and identification in imagination

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