Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty

Kelly, Sean D.

doi:10.1017/ccol0521809894.004

Cited by 47 publications

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“…6 See Rietveld 2008;Rietveld and Kiverstein 2015;Kelly 2006;Dreyfus 2002;Dreyfus and Kelly 2007. The key source in phenomenology is Merleau-Ponty on bodily intentionality (see his 1962).…”

Section: Consider the Following Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Experiencing Mandates: Towards A Hybrid Account

Mitchell

2021

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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In this paper I focus on a subset of experiences in which action properties are presented, namely those in which objects in our perceptual surroundings or environment 'demand' that certain actions be carried out, as experienced mandates (EMs). The critical part of the paper argues that a 'complex contents' view, which builds all the distinctiveness of such experiences into their perceptual content is unsatisfactory. As an alternative, I argue that EMs involve bodily potentiation best understood in terms of felt action readiness. I then outline a hybrid account, which combines content-based features of EMs with action-readiness.

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“…6 See Rietveld 2008;Rietveld and Kiverstein 2015;Kelly 2006;Dreyfus 2002;Dreyfus and Kelly 2007. The key source in phenomenology is Merleau-Ponty on bodily intentionality (see his 1962).…”

Section: Consider the Following Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Experiencing Mandates: Towards A Hybrid Account

Mitchell

2021

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…Nevertheless, there are still some angles or perspectives from where things are disclosed optimally. In this context, Merleau-Ponty claims that the optimum of perception (the optimal grip) is the way that an object present itself more clearly (Kelly, 2005), that is to say to find the right bodily articulation that better disclose the affordances of things (see section one). However, for Merleau-Ponty, the optimum (or the norm of perception) is not constituted by the characteristics of the thing itself, nor even by the relation between the body and the thing, but by the whole horizonal structure within which the body-thing correlation is enveloped (Merleau-Ponty, 2012).…”

Section: Horizons and Virtual Fieldsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Levels and Norm-Development: A Phenomenological Approach to Enactive-Ecological Norms of Action and Perception

Sepúlveda-Pedro

2020

Front. Psychol.

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The enactive approach and the skilled intentionality framework are two closely related forms of radical embodied cognition that nonetheless exhibit important differences. In this paper, I focus on a conceptual disparity regarding the normative character of action and perception. Whereas the skilled intentionality framework describes the norms of action and perception as the capacity of embodied agents to become attuned (i.e., skilled intentionality) to preestablished normative frameworks (i.e., situated normativity), the enactive approach describes the same phenomenon as the enactment of norms (i.e., as sense-making) at different levels of organization that go from individual biological agents to linguistic encounters. I will argue that although both accounts accurately recognize important features of the norms of action and perception, they also have significant shortcomings. Norm-attunement accurately sees normative, ecological frameworks as the necessary set of constraints for the existence of norms at play in sociocultural bodily practices, but it fails to acknowledge the temporal and openended character of these norms and frameworks. Norm-enactment, by contrast, acknowledges that norms of action and perception are temporally open-ended, but fails to explicitly recognize that environmental normative frameworks are necessary for the enactment and development of all sort of norms in the interactional domain of an agentenvironment system. To overcome these problems, I propose an enactive-ecological approach to norms of action and perception. This approach consists in describing normenactment as a result of a developmental process I call norm-development. This process describes the enactment of norms from the background of ecological, normative frameworks. These frameworks are norms enacted in the past of the interactional history of the agent-environment system that remain open to new configurations (new norms) in the present. To clarify conceptually norm-development, I appeal to Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of norms of perception, and more particularly to his concept of spatial levels. Like the enactive approach, Merleau-Ponty recognizes that perceptual norms emerge in the interactional history of the agent-environment system, but, like the skilled intentionality framework, he also posits that normative frameworks, that he calls levels,

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“…Aspektet kan ikke skilles fra «koppen i seg selv», men er den siden av kop-12. Kelly (2005) gir en god utdypning av dette aspektet ved Merleau-Pontys fenomenologi. Slik han legger det fram, er objekter som helhet perseptuelt til stede for oss i form av en norm som veileder vår kroppslige omgang med dem.…”

Section: Fenomenologisk Realismeunclassified

Hverdagsvirkelighet og ting i seg selv

Netland

2019

NFT

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stipendiat, Institutt for Filosofi og Religionsvitenskap, NTNU Netland startet som doktorgradsstipendiat ved Institutt for filosofi og religionsvitenskap, NTNU høsten 2018, med et prosjekt om fenomenologiens metodologiske rolle i nyere «enactivist»-tilnaerminger til kognisjonsvitenskap. I tillegg til fenomenologi og kognisjonsvitenskap, inkluderer hans interesseområder blant annet hverdagsspråkfilosofi, epistemologi og sinnsfilosofi. thomas.netland@ntnu.no SAMMENDRAG I Retrieving Realism (2015), søker Dreyfus og Taylor (D&T) å 1) forkaste det de kaller «medieringsbildet» til fordel for en «kontaktteori» om forholdet mellom sinn og verden, 2) forsvare et skille mellom «hverdagsvirkeligheten» og ting slik de er i seg selv og 3) gjøre dette uten å komme med dristige filosofiske teser. Problemet er at 2) står i fare for å undergrave muligheten for både 1) og 3). Denne artikkelen gjennomgår og problematiserer sentrale elementer i D&Ts argumentasjon, før den med utgangspunkt i en fenomenologisk persepsjonsanalyse skisserer en mer tilfredsstillende vei mot en uproblematisk realismeposisjon. NøkkelordDreyfus, fenomenologi, Merleau-Ponty, realisme, Taylor, ting i seg selv ABSTRACTIn Retrieving Realism (2015) Dreyfus and Taylor (D&T) aim to 1) reject what they call «the mediational picture» in favor of a «contact theory» regarding the mind-world relation, 2) defend a distinction between «everyday reality» and things as they are in themselves, and 3) do this without positing daring philosophical theses. The problem is that 2) seems to undermine the possibility of both 1) and 3). This article reviews some of the central elements in D&T's arguments, before sketching a more satisfactory approach toward an unproblematic realism by way of a phenomenological analysis of perception.

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Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty

Cited by 47 publications

References 0 publications

Experiencing Mandates: Towards A Hybrid Account

Experiencing Mandates: Towards A Hybrid Account

Levels and Norm-Development: A Phenomenological Approach to Enactive-Ecological Norms of Action and Perception

Hverdagsvirkelighet og ting i seg selv

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