Seeing Like the IMF on Capital Account Liberalisation

The EU, the IMF, and the Representative Turn: Addressing the Challenge of Legitimacy

“…For instance, in the EU, the activism of supranational institutions such as the Commission and the Court of Justice has allowed the EU to act well beyond the competences conferred on it by the Member States, thus raising what has been referred to as a ‘creeping competencies drift’ within the European integration process (Weatherill 2004). Secondly, several IOs are not fully responsive to the whole membership either because voting rights are skewed towards certain groups of countries (as is the case in the IMF) (see Woods 2000) or because the ‘experts’ who run the operations of IOs (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Moschella 2012b) are only partly accountable to governments and citizens (see also Machida 2009: 376). In short, the delegation strategies adopted thus far are have not been able to ensure that the IOs are responsive to the representatives.…”

Banking on Seniority: The IMF and the Sovereign’s Creditors

“…Older texts on fiscal policy activism were revisited and concerns regarding poverty and inequality found their way back into IMF research and public policy pronouncements. Moreover, the Fund began to challenge the conventional wisdom about capital account liberalization, moving away from orthodoxy in the Fund's policy advice by 2010 (Gallagher 2011;Gabor 2012;Moschella 2012).Surprisingly, despite the criticism the Fund received after its handling of the Argentinean and Russian debt crises, the post-Lehman reforms let the policies guiding the IMF involvement on sovereign debt crisis unchanged. Although post-Lehman crisis IMF programs began to focus on domestic financial sector stabilization, the way in which the Fund assessed the contributions to be made by the state and its citizens, the creditors of the state, and the official sector maintained a strict asymmetric treatment of resident and foreign claims on the state.…”

Banking on Seniority: The IMF and the Sovereign's Creditors

“…Older texts on fiscal policy activism were revisited and concerns regarding poverty and inequality found their way back into IMF research and public policy pronouncements. Moreover, the Fund began to challenge the conventional wisdom about capital account liberalization, moving away from orthodoxy in the Fund's policy advice by 2010 (Gabor ; Gallagher ; Moschella ). Surprisingly, despite the criticism the Fund received after its handling of the Argentinean and Russian debt crises, the post‐Lehman reforms let the policies guiding the IMF involvement on sovereign debt crisis unchanged.…”

“…Rogoff and Zettelmeyer () discuss proposals, since the late 70s, on how to resolve sovereign debt problems. See also Woods (2005), Moschella (), Clegg (2012), or Lütz and Kranke ().…”