"See Naples and then die"

Armstrong, T. Percy

doi:10.1093/nq/clxix.nov30.392

Cited by 7 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…But an undercurrent of resistance to (Basis) has been slowly emerging in epistemology. 19 The sorts of cases that have caused worry about (Basis) are cases where agents respond to their evidence in support of believing p, but their way of responding to their evidence is epistemically problematic for some reason or other. Turri (2010, pp.…”

Section: Reasons To Reject (Basis) and Endorse (Nohoe) Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher‐Order Evidence

Silva

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Certain plausible evidential requirements and coherence requirements on rationality seem to yield dilemmas of rationality (in a specific, objectionable sense) when put together with the possibility of misleading higher‐order evidence. Epistemologists have often taken such dilemmas to be evidence that we're working with some false principle. In what follows I show how one can jointly endorse an evidential requirement, a coherence requirement, and the possibility of misleading higher‐order evidence without running afoul of dilemmas of rationality. The trick lies in observing the difference between attitudes it is rational to hold (= propositional justification) and rationally holding those attitudes (= doxastic justification).

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Section: Reasons To Reject (Basis) and Endorse (Nohoe) Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher‐Order Evidence

Silva

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…However, some of the key effects can be illustrated in the following simple setting. 122 Suppose an incumbent VIP incurs marginal cost c 1 in supplying a retail service and 123 Notice that this discussion takes the incumbent's retail tariff as given. Ideally, wholesale and retail prices should be set simultaneously to achieve social goals, following standard Ramsey principles (Laffont and Tirole 1994).…”

Section: Establish Appropriate Access Pricesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization

Armstrong

Sappington

2006

Journal of Economic Literature

282

138

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“…The believer in universals can accept the present model only at the expense of according determinable property types a lesser status, as in the manner of Armstrong's denial of determinable universals. 26 In what follows I will simply assume that property instances are tropes. There are several independent reasons for accepting a trope ontology, none of which will be discussed here.…”

Section: What Are Determinable/determinate Instances?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Determinable‐Determinate Relation

Funkhouser

2006

Nous

155

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The properties colored and red stand in a special relation. Namely, red is a determinate of colored, and colored is determinable relative to red. Many other properties are similarly related. The determination relation is an interesting topic of logical investigation in its own right, and the prominent philosophical inquiries into this relation have, accordingly, operated at a high level of abstraction. 1 It is time to return to these investigations, not just as a logical amusement, but for the payoffs such investigation can yield in solving some basic metaphysical problems. The goal in what follows is twofold. First, I argue for a novel understanding of the determination relation. Second, this understanding is applied to yield insights into property instance (e.g., trope) individuation, how different property types can share an instance, the relation between property types and property instances, as well as applications to causation (mental causation, in particular). Criteria for a Successful AnalysisThe determination relation holds between property types. A successful analysis of this relation should accord with the following truisms about determinables and their determinates:1. The following canonical pairs must turn out to be related as determinable to determinate: colored/red, red/scarlet, and shaped/circular. The first two examples show that properties are determinables or determinates only relative to other properties. Red is determinable relative to scarlet, but determinate relative to colored. 2. For an object to have a determinate property is for that object to have the determinable properties the determinate falls under in a specific way.

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"See Naples and then die"

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher‐Order Evidence

How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher‐Order Evidence

Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization

The Determinable‐Determinate Relation

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