Security-sector reform and transitional administrations

Rees, E. A.

doi:10.1080/14678800200590604

Cited by 12 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…An array of scholars, however, have presented a more balanced review of UNTAET's legacy, underlining various shortcomings (Beauvais 2001;Gorjão 2002;Hohe 2002;Hood 2006b;King's College Conflict Security and Development Group 2003;Rees 2002;Surkhe 2001). Interestingly, some of the critical accounts came from scholars who had previously worked for UNTAET, and therefore had first-hand knowledge.…”

Section: Explaining the 2006 Crisismentioning

confidence: 95%

Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia

Heiduk¹

2014

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Section: Explaining the 2006 Crisismentioning

confidence: 95%

Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia

Heiduk¹

2014

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“…However, some were dissatisfied with their exclusion from the army and requested pensions and compensation for the contributions they made during the resistance movement. Since many of their requests could not be satisfied, some ex-combatants eventually joined anti-government groups (King’s College, 2003; Rees, 2002).…”

Section: The Case Of Timor-lestementioning

confidence: 99%

Mitigating violence by solving the commitment problem in post-conflict negotiations

Tanaka

2018

Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

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Why do some political groups choose to remain militant when they have the opportunity to transform into political parties or become members of state organs? By scrutinizing the power-sharing negotiations held before a country’s first election, this article argues that the group that leads the negotiations faces the challenge of accepting or declining the policy proposed by its counterpart who poses a threat of violence. Even if the counterpart proposes policy that is acceptable to the leading faction, fulfilling the commitment in regard to the political deal is another challenge for the leading faction. Such challenges often fail and consequently cause violence. In contrast, some counterparts can successfully transform themselves into non-violent political agencies regardless of whether they make compromises in policies or not. Third parties can play a vital role in avoiding violence by influencing actors’ decision-making or enhancing the leading faction’s ability to achieve its commitment. The article illustrates this argument by presenting a formal model and then testing the model by examining the case of Timor-Leste. It suggests specific conditions required for negotiations under which armed groups transform into peaceful actors when introduction of democracy and state-building are ongoing.

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“…Relying on an inclusive government of national unity to facilitate the passage of powers from an absolutist transitional administration to some semblance of central authority has inherent long-term dangers. In East Timor, the outcome is a division of loyalties, with the politicized armed forces proclaiming allegiance to a President powerless under the constitution, and the Prime Minister who is quickly establishing one-party rule probably complicit in the rise of independent security forces (Rees, 2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building State Failure in East Timor

Chopra

2002

Development and Change

127

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East Timor is the newest state of the twenty-first century. Yet its human development indicators compare with the most severely collapsed states in the world. Two and a half years of international administration by the United Nations seems to have had little effect on a social and political reality that has evolved by itself. In effect, the UN has given birth to a failed state. The purpose of governorship types of intervention -which attempt to (re)build governments that have collapsed or states that have failed -was to take control of a local political process and break with an abusive past. This aim was the rationale behind the most total form of international administration -UN statehood and international sovereignty in East Timor. In practice, however, the intervention failed to decentralize its own absolutist form of authority, but succeeded in excluding the local population from the equation. If there is to be any future for interventions that are both effective and legitimate, then they will need to guarantee much greater and genuine integration of the local population. 'Participatory intervention' is the next doctrinal puzzle to solve in the evolution of international state-building enterprises of any brand.

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Security-sector reform and transitional administrations

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia

Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia

Mitigating violence by solving the commitment problem in post-conflict negotiations

Building State Failure in East Timor

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