Security Protocols, Constraint Systems, and Group Theories

Delaune, Stéphanie; Kremer, Steve; Pasailă, Daniel

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31365-3_15

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Despite some advances that have been done in this direction (see e.g. [92]), analysing these protocols is still out of scope of the existing algorithms and tools.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey of symbolic methods for establishing equivalence-based properties in cryptographic protocols

Delaune¹,

Hirschi²

2017

Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming

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Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the underlying application. It ranges from the confidentiality of a data to e.g. verifiability in electronic voting systems. Another example of a security notion is privacy.Formal symbolic models have proved their usefulness for analysing the security of protocols. Until quite recently, most results focused on trace properties like confidentiality or authentication. There are however several security properties, which cannot be defined (or cannot be naturally defined) as trace properties and require a notion of behavioural equivalence. Typical examples are anonymity, and privacy related properties. During the last decade, several results and verification tools have been developed to analyse equivalence-based security properties.We propose here a synthesis of decidability and undecidability results for equivalence-based security properties. Moreover, we give an overview of existing verification tools that may be used to verify equivalence-based security properties.

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“…Despite some advances that have been done in this direction (see e.g. [92]), analysing these protocols is still out of scope of the existing algorithms and tools.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey of symbolic methods for establishing equivalence-based properties in cryptographic protocols

Delaune¹,

Hirschi²

2017

Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming

Self Cite

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“…This problem is decidable in polynomial time [23]. Note that [23] does not claim to handle private symbols, but they compute a basis of all possible solutions, and there exists a solution with h being private if only if we can find one in the basis that does not use h. The general decision procedures consist of two steps, first a unification, and then the resolution of a linear system over a polynomial ring using Gaussian elimination.…”

Section: Boolean Algebras: the Linear Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Symbolic Methods in Computational Cryptography Proofs

Barthe

Grégoire

Jacomme

et al. 2019

2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)

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Code-based game-playing is a popular methodology for proving security of cryptographic constructions and sidechannel countermeasures. This methodology relies on treating cryptographic proofs as an instance of relational program verification (between probabilistic programs), and decomposing the latter into a series of elementary relational program verification steps. In this paper, we develop principled methods for proving such elementary steps for probabilistic programs that operate over finite fields and related algebraic structures. We focus on three essential properties: program equivalence, information flow, and uniformity. We give characterizations of these properties based on deducibility and other notions from symbolic cryptography. We use (sometimes improve) tools from symbolic cryptography to obtain decision procedures or sound proof methods for program equivalence, information flow, and uniformity. Finally, we evaluate our approach using examples drawn from provable security and from sidechannel analysis-for the latter, we focus on the masking countermeasure against differential power analysis. A partial implementation of our approach is integrated in EASYCRYPT, a proof assistant for provable security, and in MASKVERIF, a fully automated prover for masked implementations.

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“…ProVerif allows only a limited use of the Diffie-Hellman theory and, in order to handle associativecommutative operators, requires additional restrictions and encodings [49], [50]. There are several decidability results for security verification modulo abelian groups in the context of a passive intruder [51] or for a bounded number of sessions [32], [33]. To our knowledge they have not been implemented, and furthermore we are interested in automated verification for the general case of an active intruder and unbounded number of sessions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contingent payments from two-party signing and verification for abelian groups

Bursuc

Mauw

2022

2022 IEEE 35th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)

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The fair exchange problem has faced for a long time the bottleneck of a required trusted third party. The recent development of blockchains introduces a new type of party to this problem, whose trustworthiness relies on a public ledger and distributed computation. The challenge in this setting is to reconcile the minimalistic and public nature of blockchains with elaborate fair exchange requirements, from functionality to privacy. Zero-knowledge contingent payments (ZKCP) are a class of protocols that are promising in this direction, allowing the fair exchange of data for payment. We propose a new ZKCP protocol that, when compared to others, requires less computation from the blockchain and less interaction between parties. The protocol is based on two-party (weak) adaptor signatures, which we show how to instantiate from state of the art multiparty signing protocols. We improve the symbolic definition of ZKCP security and, for automated verification with Tamarin, we propose a general security reduction from the theory of abelian groups to the theory of exclusive or.

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Security Protocols, Constraint Systems, and Group Theories

Cited by 8 publications

References 23 publications

A survey of symbolic methods for establishing equivalence-based properties in cryptographic protocols

A survey of symbolic methods for establishing equivalence-based properties in cryptographic protocols

Symbolic Methods in Computational Cryptography Proofs

Contingent payments from two-party signing and verification for abelian groups

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