Security of quantum cryptography against individual attacks

Slutsky, Boris; Rao, Ramesh R.; Sun, Pang-Chen; Fainman, Yeshaiahu

doi:10.1103/physreva.57.2383

Cited by 93 publications

(142 citation statements)

References 17 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

140

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…(12)- (16) The above argument is summarized as follows. Suppose that Eve conducted a strategy U and Bob obtained the values of {θ, ǫ, T } through the observed quatities and relations (14)- (16 …”

Section: Symmetrization Of Eve's Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Security of the Bennett 1992 quantum-key distribution protocol against individual attack over a realistic channel

2003

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The security of two-state quantum key distribution against individual attack is estimated when the channel has losses and noises. We assume that Alice and Bob use two nonorthogonal single-photon polarization states. To make our analysis simple, we propose a modified B92 protocol in which Alice and Bob make use of inconclusive results and Bob performs a kind of symmetrization of received states. Using this protocol, Alice and Bob can estimate Eve's information gain as a function of a few parameters which reflect the imperfections of devices or Eve's disturbance. In some parameter regions, Eve's maximum information gain shows counter-intuitive behavior, namely, it decreases as the amount of disturbances increases. For a small noise rate Eve can extract perfect information in the case where the angle between Alice's two states is small or large, while she cannot extract perfect information for intermediate angles. We also estimate the secret key gain which is the net growth of the secret key per one pulse. We show the region where the modified B92 protocol over a realistic channel is secure against individual attack.

show abstract

Section: Symmetrization Of Eve's Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Security of the Bennett 1992 quantum-key distribution protocol against individual attack over a realistic channel

2003

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Eve then sends Alice's photon to Bob, and performs a probability operator-valued measurement (POVM) on the probe photon she has retained. Slutsky et al [8] demonstrated that the Fuchs-Peres constructwith the appropriate choice of probe state, interaction, and measurement-affords Eve the maximum amount of Rényi information about the error-free sifted bits that Bob receives for a given level of disturbance, i.e., for a given probability that a sifted bit will be received in er-ror. Brandt [5] extended the Slutsky et al treatment by showing that the optimal probe could be realized with a single CNOT gate.…”

Section: The Fuchs-peres-brandt Probementioning

confidence: 99%

Attacking quantum key distribution with single-photon two-qubit quantum logic

Shapiro

Wong

2006

Phys. Rev. A

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Fuchs-Peres-Brandt (FPB) probe realizes the most powerful individual attack on BennettBrassard 1984 quantum key distribution (BB84 QKD) by means of a single controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate. This paper describes a complete physical simulation of the FPB-probe attack on polarizationbased BB84 QKD using a deterministic CNOT constructed from single-photon two-qubit quantum logic. Adding polarization-preserving quantum nondemolition measurements of photon number to this configuration converts the physical simulation into a true deterministic realization of the FPB attack.

show abstract

“…The estimation of G for continuous schemes, if possible, is important as a comparison with discrete schemes. At least, the framework [14,15] can be adapted to hybrid schemes.For these discrete schemes, the experimental imperfections are mostly determined by observed bit error rate and dark count rate of single photon detectors [11,12,13]. In continuous-variable schemes, the experimental imperfections appear as the change of quadrature distributions.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The estimation of G for continuous schemes, if possible, is important as a comparison with discrete schemes. At least, the framework [14,15] can be adapted to hybrid schemes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Practical Limitation for Continuous-Variable Quantum Cryptography using Coherent States

Namiki

Hirano

2004

Phys. Rev. Lett.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this letter, first, we investigate the security of a continuous-variable quantum cryptographic scheme with a postselection process against individual beam splitting attack. It is shown that the scheme can be secure in the presence of the transmission loss owing to the postselection. Second, we provide a loss limit for continuous-variable quantum cryptography using coherent states taking into account excess Gaussian noise on quadrature distribution. Since the excess noise is reduced by the loss mechanism, a realistic intercept-resend attack which makes a Gaussian mixture of coherent states gives a loss limit in the presence of any excess Gaussian noise.The security of quantum cryptography is degraded by the presence of realistic experimental imperfections. In particular the transmission loss limits the performance of schemes for a long distance transmission [1].Recently several continuous-variable quantum cryptographic schemes have been proposed [2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]. Those are sorted into either all-continuous type or hybrid type [5], the all-continuous scheme distributes a continuous key and the hybrid scheme distributes a discrete key. A loss limit, in the sense that the mutual information between Alice and Bob I AB cannot be greater than the Shannon information of an Eavesdropper (Eve) I E , is given for an all-continuous scheme [6] and it is shown that this limitation can be removed by introducing a postselection process for a hybrid scheme [7,8,9]. The existence of loss limit is an open question.The reliable security measure for discrete quantum cryptographic schemes against individual attacks is the secure key gain G which ensures that I E can be arbitrarily small in the long key limit if G is positive [10,11]. The question is how high G can be for a given loss or transmission distance in realistic conditions. The estimations are given for BB84 protocol [11], entangled photon protocol [12], and B92 protocol [13]. The estimation of G for continuous schemes, if possible, is important as a comparison with discrete schemes. At least, the framework [14,15] can be adapted to hybrid schemes.For these discrete schemes, the experimental imperfections are mostly determined by observed bit error rate and dark count rate of single photon detectors [11,12,13]. In continuous-variable schemes, the experimental imperfections appear as the change of quadrature distributions. Experimentally, quadrature measurement is performed slightly above the standard quantum limit and observed quadrature distribution has additional Gaussian noise upon the minimum uncertainty Gaussian wavepacket [8]. Thus, the security analysis including experimental imperfections seems to become qualitatively different from that of the discrete schemes. * Electric address: namiki@qo.phys.gakushuin.ac.jpIn our previous work [9] we estimated G of a hybrid type scheme applying a postselection [8] for a given loss, provided Eve performs quadrature measurement for the lost part of the signal. In this case it is shown that G can be positive if the loss is less...

show abstract

Security of quantum cryptography against individual attacks

Cited by 93 publications

References 17 publications

Security of the Bennett 1992 quantum-key distribution protocol against individual attack over a realistic channel

Security of the Bennett 1992 quantum-key distribution protocol against individual attack over a realistic channel

Attacking quantum key distribution with single-photon two-qubit quantum logic

Practical Limitation for Continuous-Variable Quantum Cryptography using Coherent States

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About