Security issues of the Trusted Mach system

Branstad, Martha; Tajalli, H.; Mayer, Frank

doi:10.1109/acsac.1988.113334

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Several projects that used Mach as the base for a secure operating system were inspired by that architecture. These included Trusted Mach (TMach) [36,35,196], Distributed Trusted Mach (DTMach) [282,96], the Distributed Trusted Operating System (DTOS) [313,213], and the Flask system [191,295]. TMach was built by Trusted Information Systems (TIS) and implemented multilevel security (MLS) servers for files, memory, etc.…”

Section: Microkernel Eramentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The DTE approach aims to confine UNIX processes to protect the trusted computing base from other root processes. Strictly speaking, DTE UNIX runs as a server on a TMach system [35,15]. However, we consider DTE to be a retrofit of UNIX because the reference monitor is added to the UNIX server (OSF/1), not to TMach.…”

Section: Domain and Type Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…New operating systems often define new APIs, resulting in the need to port applications and/or write new applications. This has been a major problem in gaining acceptance for secure operating systems based on emerging kernels, such as Trusted Mach [35] and Flask [295], and the reason for so much focus on securing commercial systems.…”

Section: Secure Virtual Machine Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Operating System Security

Jaeger

2008

Synthesis Lectures on Information Security, Privacy, and Trust

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Operating systems provide the fundamental mechanisms for securing computer processing. Since the 1960s, operating systems designers have explored how to build "secure" operating systemsoperating systems whose mechanisms protect the system against a motivated adversary. Recently, the importance of ensuring such security has become a mainstream issue for all operating systems. In this book, we examine past research that outlines the requirements for a secure operating system and research that implements example systems that aim for such requirements. For system designs that aimed to satisfy these requirements, we see that the complexity of software systems often results in implementation challenges that we are still exploring to this day. However, if a system design does not aim for achieving the secure operating system requirements, then its security features fail to protect the system in a myriad of ways. We also study systems that have been retrofit with secure operating system features after an initial deployment. In all cases, the conflict between function on one hand and security on the other leads to difficult choices and the potential for unwise compromises. From this book, we hope that systems designers and implementors will learn the requirements for operating systems that effectively enforce security and will better understand how to manage the balance between function and security.

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Section: Microkernel Eramentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Domain and Type Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Secure Virtual Machine Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Operating System Security

Jaeger

2008

Synthesis Lectures on Information Security, Privacy, and Trust

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Extended Role Based Access Control with Procedural Constraints for Trusted Operating Systems

Shin

Park

Lee

2005

IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems

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The current scheme of access control judges the legality of each access based on immediate information without considering associate information hidden in a series of accesses. Due to the deficiency, access control systems do not efficiently limit attacks consist of ordinary operations. For trusted operating system developments, we extended RBAC and added negative procedural constraints to refuse those attacks. With the procedural constraints, the access control of trusted operating systems can discriminate attack trials from normal behaviors. This paper shows the specification of the extended concept and model, and presents simple analysis results.

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Issues in distributed database security

Downing

Greenberg

Lunt

[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

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Security issues of the Trusted Mach system

Cited by 6 publications

References 1 publication

Operating System Security

Operating System Security

Extended Role Based Access Control with Procedural Constraints for Trusted Operating Systems

Issues in distributed database security

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