Security in Automotive Networks

Abstract

With the increasing amount of interconnections between vehicles, the attack surface of internal vehicle networks is rising steeply. Although these networks are shielded against external attacks, they often do not have any internal security to protect against malicious components or adversaries who can breach the network perimeter. To secure the in-vehicle network, all communicating components must be authenticated, and only authorized components should be allowed to send and receive messages. This is achieved through the use of an authentication framework. Cryptography is widely used to authenticate communicating parties and provide secure communication channels (e.g. Internet communication). However, the real-time performance requirements of in-vehicle networks restrict the types of cryptographic algorithms and protocols that may be used. In particular, asymmetric cryptography is computationally infeasible during vehicle operation.In this work, we address the challenges of designing authentication protocols for automotive systems. We present Lightweight Authentication for Secure Automotive Networks (LASAN), a full life-cycle authentication approach. We describe the core LASAN protocols and show how they protect the internal vehicle network while complying with the real-time constraints and low computational resources of this domain. By leveraging on the fixed structure of automotive networks, we minimize bandwidth and computation requirements. Unlike previous work, we also explain how this framework can be integrated into all aspects of the automotive product life cycle, including manufacturing, vehicle maintenance and software updates. We evaluate LASAN in two different ways: Firstly, we analyze the security properties of the protocols using established protocol verification techniques based on formal methods. Secondly, we evaluate the timing requirements of LASAN and compare these to other frameworks using a new highly modular discrete event simulator for in-vehicle networks, which we have developed for this evaluation. CCS Concepts: •Computer systems organization → Embedded and cyber-physical systems; •Security and privacy → Network security; •Networks → Network protocol design; ACM Reference Format: P. Mundhenk et al.or even impossible, to reliably control all entry points into the vehicle or shield the vehicular network with firewalls. Hence, it is important that, besides the external access points, communication within a vehicle is secured. This does not only hold if the external protections are breached, but also for targeted attacks, e.g., via the internal On-Board Diagnosis (OBD) port, the infotainment system or the telematics unit. With the introduction of networked comfort and entertainment functions, as well as Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADASs), vehicles are more readily connected to external networks, such as car-to-x networks and the Internet. This trend towards interconnectivity continues in the vehicle interior. Increasingly, passengers and drivers connect smartphones and other mobile de...

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