Security implementation within GEN2 protocol

Seshabhattar, Sai; Jagannatha, S.; Engels, Daniel W.

doi:10.1109/rfid-ta.2011.6068669

Cited by 6 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Seshabhatta et al proposed [15] the integration of two security levels to secure the EPC GEN2 communication between a tag and a reader. The level1 is represented in the secure identification phase that allows the security of the tag identity, whereas the level2 is represented in the mutual authentication protocol that allows to ensure the authenticity of the reader and the tag.…”

Section: A Mutual Authentication Protocol Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, for resource limited embedded systems, it is important to use an adapted level of security (often related to the number of bits of the secret key) in order to reduce both hardware overhead and power consumption. For example, Sai Seshabhattar et al [15] proposed an implementation of PRESENT in EPC Class1 Gen2 protocol for UHF RFID tags. They implemented a low cost mutual authentication protocol based on encryption operations in the tag and decryption operations in the reader.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This limitation prevents the attacker to save enough electromagnetic traces to perform the EMA. First, we choose to study the vulnerability of an existing mutual authentication protocol proposed by Sai Seshabhattar et al [15] against EMA. This protocol integrating PRESENT block cipher is used for low cost full-fledged RFID tags.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Low Cost Countermeasure at Authentication Protocol Level against Electromagnetic Side Channel Attacks on RFID Tags

Naija¹,

Beroulle²,

Machhout³

2017

ijacsa

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Abstract-Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is widely spread in many security applications. Producing secured low-cost and low-power RFID tags is a challenge. The used of lightweight encryption algorithms can be an economic solution for these RFID security applications. This article proposes low cost countermeasure to secure RFID tags against Electromagnetic Side Channel Attacks (EMA). Firstly, we proposed a parallel architecture of PRESENT block cipher that represents a one way of hiding countermeasures against EMA. 200 000 Electromagnetic traces are used to attack the proposed architecture, whereas 10 000 EM traces are used to attack an existing serial architecture of PRESENT. Then we proposed a countermeasure at mutual authentication protocol by limiting progressively the number of EM traces. This limitation prevents the attacker to perform the EMA. The proposed countermeasure is based on time delay function. It requires 960 GEs and represents a low cost solution compared to existing countermeasures at primitive block cipher (2471 GEs).

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Section: A Mutual Authentication Protocol Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Low Cost Countermeasure at Authentication Protocol Level against Electromagnetic Side Channel Attacks on RFID Tags

Naija¹,

Beroulle²,

Machhout³

2017

ijacsa

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In a query command, using typical parameters (i.e., DR = 8, M = 1, and, therefore, a link rate of 128 kbps), the T1 boundary becomes 78.125 µs. Some implementations use a 2‐MHz chip clock rate, which leaves a maximum of 157 clocks cycles for protocol execution .…”

Section: Secure Management Of Rfid Nodes and Sensors In The Architecturementioning

confidence: 99%

User‐centric secure integration of personal RFID tags and sensor networks

Nájera

Román

López

2013

Security Comm Networks

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A personal network (PN) should enable the collaboration of user's devices and services in a flexible, self‐organizing, and friendly manner. For such purpose, the PN must securely accommodate heterogeneous technologies with uneven computational and communication resources. In particular, personal radio frequency identification (RFID) tags can enable seamless recognition of user's context, provide user authentication, and enable novel services enhancing the quality and quantity of data handled by the PN. However, the highly constrained features of common RFID tags and their passive role in the network highlights the need of an adequate secure communication model with personal tags, which enables their participation as a member of the PN. In this paper, we present our concept of PN, with special emphasis on the role of RFID and sensor networks, and define a secure architecture for PNs including methods for the secure access to context‐aware technologies from both local PN members and the Internet of Things. The PN architecture is designed to support differentiated security mechanisms to maximize the level of security for each type of personal device. Furthermore, we analyze which security solutions available in the literature can be adapted for our architecture, as well as the challenges and security mechanisms still necessary in the secure integration of personal tags. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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“…The work is compared with yet-another Trivial Authentication protocol with improvements in the computational effort and implemented in real-time environments. The EPC GEN-2 protocol design with Humming-bird (HB), XTEA, and PRESENT security algorithms are designed for mutual authentication by Seshabhattar et al [19]. The GEN2 protocol includes command detection module, Finite state machine (FSM) along with Response module for Tag identification.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

International Journal of Electronics and Telecommunications

Anusha

Shastrimath

2021

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RFID systems are one of the essential technologies and used many diverse applications. The security and privacy are the primary concern in RFID systems which are overcome by using suitable authentication protocols. In this manuscript, the costeffective RFID-Mutual Authentication (MA) using a lightweight Extended Tiny encryption algorithm (XTEA) is designed to overcome the security and privacy issues on Hardware Platform. The proposed design provides two levels of security, which includes secured Tag identification and mutual authentication. The RFID-MA mainly has Reader and Tag along with the backend Server. It establishes the secured authentication between Tag and Reader using XTEA. The XTEA with Cipher block chaining (CBC) is incorporated in RFID for secured MA purposes. The authentication process completed based on the challenge and response between Reader and Tag using XTEA-CBC. The present work is designed using Verilog-HDL on the Xilinx environment and implemented on Artix-7 FPGA. The simulation and synthesis results discussed with hardware constraints like Area, power, and time. The present work is compared with existing similar approaches with hardware constraints improvements.

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Security implementation within GEN2 protocol

Cited by 6 publications

References 13 publications

Low Cost Countermeasure at Authentication Protocol Level against Electromagnetic Side Channel Attacks on RFID Tags

Low Cost Countermeasure at Authentication Protocol Level against Electromagnetic Side Channel Attacks on RFID Tags

User‐centric secure integration of personal RFID tags and sensor networks

International Journal of Electronics and Telecommunications

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