Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation

Bleek, Philipp C.; Lorber, Eric

doi:10.1177/0022002713509050

Cited by 88 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…With regard to the second strand, studies have been concerned with, among others: the relevance of assault weapon bans and weapon laws on murder rates (Gius ); assessments of whether nuclear weapons are worth having (Suni ); the nexus between nuclear strategy, nonproliferation, and nuclear deployment (Fuhrmann and Sechser ); questioning the effect of nuclear weapons on conflicts (Bell and Miller ); and security guarantees and nuclear proliferation (Bleek and Lorber ).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Persistence of Weapons: Global Evidence

2020

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This article investigates persistence (or hysteresis) in weapons using a panel of 163 countries for the period 2010‐15. The following are some main findings: (1) compared to countries that are landlocked, persistence in heavy weapons is more apparent in nations that are open to the sea; (2) relative to the Middle East and North Africa, heavy weapons are more persistent in the East Asia and the Pacific countries. This tendency is consistent with “weapons imports;” (3) evidence of persistence is not very apparent in “weapons imports” with the exception of the fact that it is higher in low‐income countries, compared to their high‐income counterparts. Hence, there is less hysteresis in weapons exports when compared with heavy weapons exports; and (4) the determinants of persistence employed in the conditioning information set are contingent on fundamental characteristics and panels. Policy implications are discussed. Related Articles Beal, Amanda L., and Leah Graham. 2014. “Foundations for Change: Rule of Law, Development, and Democratization.” Politics & Policy 42 (3): 311‐345. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12077 Fails, Matthew D. 2014. “Leader Turnover, Volatility, and Political Risk.” Politics & Policy 42 (3): 369‐399. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12078 Jakubow, Alexander. 2014. “State Intervention and Life Satisfaction Reconsidered: The Role of Governance Quality and Resource Misallocation.” Politics & Policy 42 (1): 3‐36. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12057 Peev, Evgeni, and Dennis C. Mueller. 2013. “Democracy, Economic Freedom and Growth in Transition Economies.” Kyklos 65 (3): 371‐407. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6435.2012.00543.x/abstract Siddiqui, Danish A., and Qazi M. Ahmed. 2013. “The Effect of Institutions on Economic Growth: A Global Analysis Based on GMM Dynamic Panel Estimation.” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 24: 18‐33. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0954349X12000902

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The Persistence of Weapons: Global Evidence

2020

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“…107 Indeed, as Philipp Bleek and Eric Lorber suggest, security guarantees significantly reduce reactive proliferation proclivities, especially before an operational program is put in place. 108 Obviously, the Israeli threat assessment cannot assume such United States commitment. Rather, Israel should weigh carefully the possible consequences of reactive proliferation.…”

Section: Assessing the Existential Nuclear Threat: The Strategic Contmentioning

confidence: 99%

Israeli Perceptions of the Iranian Nuclear Threat

Merom¹

2017

Political Science Quarterly

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ISRAELI DECISION MAKERS HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY attentive to the Iranian nuclear threat since the 1990s. 1 They have debated extensively the threat of nuclear Iran and have consistently found it intolerable. 2 The United States and Western powers brought Iran to the negotiation table and to signing a nuclear deal through escalating cycles of sanctions. 3 A successful conclusion of the negotiations should have presumably alleviated the concerns of alarmists in Israel. This however, is not the case. While the professional Israeli security elite considers favorably if cautiously the nuclear deal with Iran, 4 the political leadership remains antagonistic. Israel retains its invested GIL MEROM is a researcher in the Centre for International Security Studies (CISS) and the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney.He has been writing on various aspects of the democratic use of military force, and recently published in the Middle East Journal an article on Israel's preventive strike option against Iran. He is currently writing on democracy and collateral damage in asymmetric conflicts.

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“…19 States' alliance relationships with nuclear powers (so-called "nuclear umbrella" relationships) are proxied by coding a count variable (Nuclear Defense Pacts) for the number of defense pacts that a country possesses with nuclear-armed states. Previous findings have shown that nuclear-armed states can discourage their alliance partners from acquiring nuclear weapons (Jo and Gartzke 2007;Bleek and Lorber 2014). 20 To account for the salient nuclear weapons threats posed by the United States and the Soviet Union, we included a dichotomous variable (Super Power Rivalry) to denote whether countries had a strategic rivalry with either state.…”

Section: Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

First Missiles, then Nukes? Explaining the Connection between Missile Programs and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Early¹,

Way²

2017

kjis

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If countries invest in acquiring missile technology, does that in turn raise their likelihood of obtaining nuclear weapons capabilities? We argue that states that make long-term investments in mastering rocket technology are more likely to become latent nuclear weapons states or acquire nuclear weapons. Investing in the development of scientific and military industrial complexes (SMICs) within the military rocketry sector provides positive spillover from the research infrastructure that is built, the industries and scientific communities that are cultivated, and the lessons derived from managing complex research endeavors. Furthermore, such programs create constituencies that will advocate for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Via a global analysis from 1945 to 2007, we find that possessing mature military rocketry R&D programs, as opposed to simply possessing short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), increases the likelihood that a country will acquire the capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. Our findings contribute to the research agendas on the domestic sources of security policy and supply-side theories of nuclear proliferation.

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Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation

Cited by 88 publications

References 41 publications

The Persistence of Weapons: Global Evidence

The Persistence of Weapons: Global Evidence

Israeli Perceptions of the Iranian Nuclear Threat

First Missiles, then Nukes? Explaining the Connection between Missile Programs and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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