Security Comparisons and Performance Analyses of Post-quantum Signature Algorithms

Raavi, Manohar; Wuthier, Simeon; Chandramouli, Pranav; Balytskyi, Yaroslav; Zhou, Xiaobo; Chang, Sang‐Yoon

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-78375-4_17

Cited by 23 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…At SL 1 post-q, Falcon512 is used, as its 666 Byte signature 5 is almost four times smaller as the other final-round candidate Dilithium with 2420 Byte 6 . Also public key sizes of Fal-con512, with 897 Byte, are considerably smaller than the only other post-quantum candidate Rainbow-I, that offers a smaller signature size of 528 Byte but at the cost of a much larger public key size of 157.8 kB [59]. At SL 2 post-q Falcon1024 is used.…”

Section: A Certificates and Certificate Handlingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advancing the Security of LDACS

Mäurer

Gräupl

Schmitt

et al. 2022

IEEE Trans. Netw. Serv. Manage.

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The "Single European Sky" air traffic management master plan foresees the introduction of several modern digital data links for aeronautical communications. The candidate for long-range continental communications is the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS). LDACS is a cellular, ground-based digital communications system for flight guidance and communications related to safety and regularity of flight. Hence, the aeronautical standards, imposed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), for cybersecurity of the link and network layer, apply. In previous works, threat-and risk analyses of LDACS were conducted, a draft for an LDACS cybersecurity architecture introduced, algorithms proposed, and the security of a Mutual Authentication and Key Establishment (MAKE) procedure of LDACS formally verified. However, options for cipher-suites and certificate management for LDACS were missing. Also, previous works hardly discussed the topic of post-quantum security for LDACS. This paper proposes a cell-attachment procedure, which establishes a secure LDACS communication channel between an aircraft and corresponding ground-station upon cell-entry of the aircraft. Via the design of a hybrid LDACS Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the choice of a pre-or post-quantum Security Level (SL) is up to the communications participants. With that, this work introduces a full LDACS cell-attachment protocol based on a PKI, certificates, certificate revocation and cipher-suites including pre-and postquantum options. Evaluations in the symbolic model show the procedure to fulfill LDACS security requirements and a communications performance evaluation demonstrates feasibility, matching requirements imposed by regulatory documents.

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Section: A Certificates and Certificate Handlingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advancing the Security of LDACS

Mäurer

Gräupl

Schmitt

et al. 2022

IEEE Trans. Netw. Serv. Manage.

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“…A similar approach is also followed in [13] but for post-quantum digital signature algorithms. The performance of post-quantum digital signature algorithms is also studied in [20] , and a security comparison of these algorithms is also performed therein.…”

Section: Relevant Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating the performance of post-quantum secure algorithms in the TLS protocol

Tzinos¹,

Limniotis²,

Kolokotronis³

2022

J Surveill Secur Saf

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Aim: The imminent advent of large-scale quantum computers within the next years is expected to highly affect the security of several cryptosystems that are now considered secure; this mainly holds for classical, long-established, public key cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. Apparently, any security protocol that relies on such ciphers, including the transport layer security (TLS) protocol which constitutes a somewhat de facto standard for the security on the web, will not be considered secure in the post-quantum era. To alleviate the security risks stemming from quantum computing, several proposals have been submitted to the relevant procedure initiated by NIST towards evaluating and standardizing one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. This paper focuses on embedding post-quantum secure cryptographic algorithms into the TLS protocol to analyze its performance. More precisely, the paper aims to analyze whether this transition to post-quantum secure algorithms will have a significant impact on the user experience due to the possible increase of client--server communication times. Methods: Having as the starting point several important works in the field, several experiments were carried out, using combinations of cloud and local virtual machines per case and considering all the post-quantum cryptographic algorithm finalists for key exchange from the third round of the ongoing NIST process, for various cryptographic as well as network parameters. Results: Our results exhibit that, for key exchange in TLS, the best performance among the post-quantum secure ciphers is achieved by the Saber and CRYSTAL-Kyber variants for all security levels, regardless of the underlying computing power. The performance is comparable to that of the corresponding one achieved by a classical elliptic curve algorithm for key exchange for both RTT and packet loss ratio — i.e., the network parameters seem to have the same effect on post-quantum secure algorithms as in the case of a conventional elliptic curve algorithm. However, the effect of the network parameters on the performance is more crucial than the effect of the underlying chosen ciphers. Conclusion: According to the experiments, we conclude that there exist very promising algorithms that could be utilized in TLS in the near future, which may behave even better than the conventional elliptic curve algorithms for key exchange. It should also be pointed out that NIST announced on 5 July 2022 (i.e., after the completion of our research experiments) that, for general encryption used when we access secure websites, the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm has been selected, having as one of its advantages the speed of operation. Hence, the results of our paper are fully in line with the progress of the NIST process. Taking into account that the NIST process is still ongoing (now in its fourth round) with the aim to select more algorithms, as well as that some algorithms may be standardized outside NIST, it becomes evident that our results provide very useful insights on performance aspects of the post-quantum secure algorithms.

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“…The main measurement we can take to measure quantum resistance is to count how many quantum gates or quantum bits are needed. [8] But unfortunately this is rather hard and there is currently no standard benchmark to measure quantum resistance [9], nevertheless the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) created a standard that describes how secure a scheme is against a quantum computer by classifying it within 5 classes that can be determined with grovers algorithm [10], [11]. Those classes can be seen in table III-C.…”

Section: Performance Metricsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But, all these schemes are stateless and both Dilithium and FALCON (as well as qTesla) are lattice based schemes, the last finalist, Rainbow is code based, and as we can also see from the enormous signature size SPHINCS is the only hash based contender, but did not make it to the finalists. It was also observed that FALCON and Dilithium have the best security against quantum computers and annealers to computational expenses ratio [8]. We will therefor focus on these schemes in the following sections.…”

Section: B Comparison Of Different Signaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum-resistant digital signatures schemes for low-power IoT

Hattenbach

2021

Preprint

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Quantum computers are on the horizon to get to a sufficient size that will then be able to break pretty much all the encryption and signature schemes we currently use. This is the case for human interface devices as well as for IoT nodes. In this paper i am comparing some signature schemes currently in the process of standardization by the NIST. After explaining the underlying basis on why some schemes are different in some aspects compared to others i will evaluate which currently available implementations are better suited for usage in IoT usecases. We will come to further focus on the most promising schemes FALCON and Dilithium, which differ in one signifiant aspect that makes FALCON worse for signing but very good for verification purposes.

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Security Comparisons and Performance Analyses of Post-quantum Signature Algorithms

Cited by 23 publications

References 32 publications

Advancing the Security of LDACS

Advancing the Security of LDACS

Evaluating the performance of post-quantum secure algorithms in the TLS protocol

Quantum-resistant digital signatures schemes for low-power IoT

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