In this paper, the focus will be on the EU's region-building practice in the Mediterranean via an evaluation of the successes and failures of the EMP, ENP and operations under the ESDP. With this aim in mind, some general approaches to regionbuilding and how the Mediterranean is defined will be briefly examined. Drawing on the experiences of the Union on the ground, an assessment will be made as to what the next move of the Union in the Mediterranean will be in order for it to realise the aims stated in the Union's Security Document.The end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks have had an enormous impact in the realm of security. In parallel with these developments, the threat perceptions of the West have radically changed and thus the West in general, and the EU in particular, has felt obliged to adapt to this new security environment. The adaptation process of course has brought forth changes in the strategic assessments of the Union. However, the EU preference for using its own normative ('soft') power to tackle the risks and threats of the new century has not changed. The normative power of the Union means the EU has the capacity to aim 'to reproduce itself through encouraging regional integration around the World', 1 and most importantly in its own periphery.As one of the Union's natural peripheries, the Mediterranean region is naturally considered part of the new security environment of the EU. Thus, as mentioned in the European Security Strategy Document, the Mediterranean has not been able to save itself from the negative impacts of the new risks it faces, such as terrorism, intolerance, environmental and economic degradation and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The EU governments in general believe that unless the continuing problems in the Mediterranean related to democracy, good governance, economic development, and security,