Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks Under DER Node Compromises

Shelar, Devendra; Amin, Saurabh

doi:10.1109/tcns.2016.2598427

Cited by 32 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…This two-step cyber-attacks comprising topologypreserving attacks and load redistribution attacks, ensuring the bad data measurements are undetectable. In [150], the authors investigated the security assessment of electricity distribution networks with vulnerable DERs nodes. The game-theoretical model is used to model a 3-stage defenderattacker-defender (DAD) tri-level optimization problem.…”

Section: (Ii) Game-theoretic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS): A Review on Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis With Cyber Security Applications

Yohanandhan

Elavarasan²,

Premkumar³

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

205

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Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is a new kind of digital technology that increases its attention across academia, government, and industry sectors and covers a wide range of applications like agriculture, energy, medical, transportation, etc. The traditional power systems with physical equipment as a core element are more integrated with information and communication technology, which evolves into the Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS). The CPPS consists of a physical system tightly integrated with cyber systems (control, computing, and communication functions) and allows the two-way flows of electricity and information for enabling smart grid technologies. Even though the digital technologies monitoring and controlling the electric power grid more efficiently and reliably, the power grid is vulnerable to cybersecurity risk and involves the complex interdependency between cyber and physical systems. Analyzing and resolving the problems in CPPS needs the modelling methods and systematic investigation of a complex interaction between cyber and physical systems. The conventional way of modelling, simulation, and analysis involves the separation of physical domain and cyber domain, which is not suitable for the modern CPPS. Therefore, an integrated framework needed to analyze the practical scenario of the unification of physical and cyber systems. A comprehensive review of different modelling, simulation, and analysis methods and different types of cyber-attacks, cybersecurity measures for modern CPPS is explored in this paper. A review of different types of cyber-attack detection and mitigation control schemes for the practical power system is presented in this paper. The status of the research in CPPS around the world and a new path for recommendations and research directions for the researchers working in the CPPS are finally presented.

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Section: (Ii) Game-theoretic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS): A Review on Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis With Cyber Security Applications

Yohanandhan

Elavarasan²,

Premkumar³

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

205

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Therefore, mitigation of cyber risks in electric power networks has attracted a lot of research attention. Among recent research activities on enhancing cyber security of power systems, Shelar et al proposes a game-theoretical model to optimize the security strategy of electricity distribution networks (Shelar and Amin 2016). They consider a specific adversary model, in which false data injection attacks are used to compromise vulnerable distributed energy resource (DER) nodes.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk mitigation in electric power systems: Where to start?

Alshawish

Meer

2019

Energy Inform

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Power grids are becoming increasingly intelligent. In this regard, they benefit considerably from the information technology (IT) networks coupled with their underlying operational technology (OT) networks. While IT networks provide sufficient controllability and observability of power grid assets such as voltage and reactive power controllers, distributed energy resources, among others, they make those critical assets vulnerable to cyber threats and risks. In such systems, however, several technical and economic factors can significantly affect the patching and upgrading decisions of their components including, but not limited to, limited time and budget as well as legal constraints. Thus, resolving all vulnerabilities at once could seem like an insuperable hurdle. To figure out where to start, an involved decision maker (e.g. a security team) has to prudently prioritize the possible vulnerability remediation actions. The key objective of prioritization is to efficiently reduce the inherent security risk to which the system in question is exposed. Due to the critical role of power systems, their decision makers tend to enhance the system resilience against extreme events. Thus, they seek to avoid decision options associated with likely severe risks. Practically, this risk attitude guides the decision-making process in such critical organizations and hence the sought-after prioritization as well. Therefore, the contribution of this work is to provide an integrated risk-based decisionsupport methodology for prioritizing possible remediation activities. It leverages the Time-To-Compromise security metric to quantitatively assess the risk of compromise. The developed risk estimator considers several factors including: i) the inherent assessment uncertainty, ii) interdependencies between the network components, iii) different adversary skill levels, and iv) public vulnerability and exploit information. Additionally, our methodology employs game theory principles to support the strategic decision-making process by constructing a chain of security games. Technically, the remediation actions are prioritized through successively playing a set of dependent zero-sum games. The underlying game-theoretical model considers carefully the stochastic nature of risk assessments and the specific risk attitude of the decision makers involved in the patch management process across electric power organizations.

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“…This exposes the operation of the network to malicious attacks from adversaries. Such data tampering will affect the control functions of the distribution management system (DMS) such as integrated volt var control (VVC) and thus, resulting into less reliable and efficient operation of the network [3]- [5]. VVC is an integral part of modern distribution management system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, they have not considered PV systems in their framework. Reference [5] have assessed the security of the system under DER node compromises in a radial system with no reverse power flow. Reference [4] has discussed the cyber attacks on voltage control with PVs on a radial system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Centralized Volt–Var Optimization Strategy Considering Malicious Attack on Distributed Energy Resources Control

Majumdar

Agalgaonkar

Pal

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Sustain. Energy

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The adoption of information and communication technology based centralized volt-var control (VVC) leads to an optimal operation of a distribution feeder. However, it also poses a challenge that an adversary can tamper with the metered data and, thus, can render the VVC action ineffective. Distribution system state estimation (DSSE) acts as a backbone of centralized VVC. Distributed energy resources (DER) injection measurements constitute leverage measurements from a DSSE point of view. This paper proposes two solutions as a volt-var optimization DSSE malicious attack mitigating strategy when the DER injection measurements are compromised. The first solution is based on local voltage regulation controller set-points. The other solution effectively employs historical data or forecast information. The concept is based on a cumulant-based probabilistic optimal power flow with the objective of minimizing the expectation of total power losses. The effectiveness of the approach is performed on the 95-bus U.K. generic distribution system and validated against Monte Carlo simulations. Index Terms-Bad data detection (BDD), distributed energy resources (DER), malicious attacks, volt var optimization (VVO).

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Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks Under DER Node Compromises

Cited by 32 publications

References 18 publications

Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS): A Review on Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis With Cyber Security Applications

Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS): A Review on Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis With Cyber Security Applications

Risk mitigation in electric power systems: Where to start?

Centralized Volt–Var Optimization Strategy Considering Malicious Attack on Distributed Energy Resources Control

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