Security Arguments for Digital Signatures and Blind Signatures

Pointcheval, David; Stern, Jacques

doi:10.1007/s001450010003

Cited by 1,641 publications

(990 citation statements)

References 45 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

931

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Proof: We use the Forking Lemma introduced by Pointcheval and Stern [24] to prove this theorem. Suppose that a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can forge a valid DV-signature of our proposed UDVS scheme with a non-negligible advantage under the adaptive chosen message attack after asking at most q hi h i random oracle (for i = 1 and 2) and q PSG PSG queries.…”

Section: Chosen-message Attacks (Ef-cma) In the Random Oracle Model Imentioning

confidence: 99%

ID-Based Non-Interactive Universal Designated Verifier Signature for Privacy-Preserving Applications

Lin¹

2015

IJCTE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-A Universal Designated Verifier Signature (UDVS) scheme is an ideal mechanism for preventing any signature holder from arbitrarily disseminating the signature, so as to protect the privacy of original signer. Such schemes are suitable for applications like the certificate of medical records and income summary, etc. In this scheme, a signature holder (designator) can generate a designated verifier signature which can only be verified by an intended verifier. Additionally, the verifier cannot transfer his proof to any third party, since he is also capable of simulating a computationally indistinguishable transcript. In this paper, the author proposes a new ID-based non-interactive UDVS scheme based on the assumption of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP). To ensure the security of proposed scheme, the requirement of strong unforgeability is formally proved in the random oracle model. Compared with previous works, our mechanism also provides better functionalities.Index Terms-Universal designated verifier signature, bilinear pairings, privacy-preserving, random oracle, public key system.

show abstract

Section: Chosen-message Attacks (Ef-cma) In the Random Oracle Model Imentioning

confidence: 99%

ID-Based Non-Interactive Universal Designated Verifier Signature for Privacy-Preserving Applications

Lin¹

2015

IJCTE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Such proofs can be efficiently done in the random-oracle model [5], with simple indistinguishable simulation under the decisional DiffieHellman assumption, and with the additional property of simulation-soundness [30]. Furthermore, we can extract x with overwhelming probability, using an improvement of the forking lemma [29], as we now explain with more details.…”

Section: A Proofs Of Validity and Extractorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A security solution for IEEE 802.11's ad hoc mode: password-authentication and group Diffie Hellman key exchange

Bresson¹,

Chevassut²,

Pointcheval³

2007

IJWMC

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The IEEE 802 standards ease the deployment of networking infrastructures and enable employers to access corporate networks while traveling. These standards provide two modes of communication called infrastructure and ad-hoc modes. A security solution for the IEEE 802.11's infrastructure mode took several years to reach maturity and firmware are still been upgraded, yet a solution for the ad-hoc mode needs to be specified. The present paper is a first attempt in this direction. It leverages the latest developments in the area of password-based authentication and (group) DiffieHellman key exchange to develop a provably-secure key-exchange protocol for IEEE 802.11's ad-hoc mode. The protocol allows users to securely join and leave the wireless group at time, accommodates either a single-shared password or pairwise-shared passwords among the group members, or at least with a central server; achieves security against dictionary attacks in the ideal-hash model (i.e. random-oracles). This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first such protocol to appear in the cryptographic literature.

show abstract

“…First, they tried to add a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of discrete logarithm, using the Schnorr signature [44]. But they remarked that the decryption simulation without the secret key would require an exponential time, because of a combinatorial explosion of the forking lemma [39]. This explosion can be avoided under stronger assumption [45].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With this generic construction, it is not clear that the proof c does not leak any information (as remarked in [33]), furthermore such a proof can seldom be done efficiently in the standard model. However, the random oracle model allows to make efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [39].…”

Section: Generic Conversion Gcmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Threshold Cryptosystems Secure against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks

Fouque

Pointcheval

2001

Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT 2001

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Semantic security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) is widely believed as the correct security level for public-key encryption scheme. On the other hand, it is often dangerous to give to only one people the power of decryption. Therefore, threshold cryptosystems aimed at distributing the decryption ability. However, only two efficient such schemes have been proposed so far for achieving IND-CCA. Both are El Gamal-like schemes and thus are based on the same intractability assumption, namely the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. In this article we rehabilitate the twin-encryption paradigm proposed by Naor and Yung to present generic conversions from a large family of (threshold) IND-CPA scheme into a (threshold) IND-CCA one in the random oracle model. An efficient instantiation is also proposed, which is based on the Paillier cryptosystem. This new construction provides the first example of threshold cryptosystem secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks based on the factorization problem. Moreover, this construction provides a scheme where the "homomorphic properties" of the original scheme still hold. This is rather cumbersome because homomorphic cryptosystems are known to be malleable and therefore not to be CCA secure. However, we do not build a "homomorphic cryptosystem", but just keep the homomorphic properties.

show abstract

Security Arguments for Digital Signatures and Blind Signatures

Cited by 1,641 publications

References 45 publications

ID-Based Non-Interactive Universal Designated Verifier Signature for Privacy-Preserving Applications

ID-Based Non-Interactive Universal Designated Verifier Signature for Privacy-Preserving Applications

A security solution for IEEE 802.11's ad hoc mode: password-authentication and group Diffie Hellman key exchange

Threshold Cryptosystems Secure against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About