Securing wastewater facilities from accidental and intentional harm: A cost-benefit analysis

Papa, Stephen M.; Casper, William D.; Moore, Tyler

doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2013.05.002

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The attackers generally acquire the following goals step by step: (1) compromising the station management authority by launching cyberattacks, 16 (2) reducing the station capacity using the compromised authority, (3) propagating the station incident in the CI network due to interdependences, 17 and (4) causing negative impact on society. 18,19 On the contrary, the CI defenders need to perform the following operations: (1) making security strategy to prevent the authority compromise and capacity reduction within the station, (2) making scheduling strategy to prevent the incident propagating in the CI network, and (3) making policy to mitigate the negative impact on society. According to the above discussion, the station operation and CI states are changed with attacks propagating.…”

Section: Analysis Of Response Strategy Making In Cismentioning

confidence: 99%

A hierarchical colored Petri net–based cyberattacks response strategy making approach for critical infrastructures

Zhu

Qin

Zhao

et al. 2020

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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Critical infrastructures are essential for national security, economy, and public safety. As an important part of security protection, response strategy making provides useful countermeasures to reduce the impacts of cyberattacks. However, there have been few researches in this domain that investigate the cyberattack propagation within a station and the incident spreading process in the critical infrastructure network simultaneously, let along analyzing the relationships between security strategy making for a station and scheduling strategy for the critical infrastructure network. To tackle this problem, a hierarchical colored Petri net–based cyberattacks response strategy making approach for critical infrastructures is presented. In this approach, the relationships among cyberattacks, security measures, devices, functions, and station capacity are analyzed and described in a hierarchical way, and the system loss is calculated with the input of abnormal station capacities. Then, based on the above model, the security strategy making for a station and the scheduling strategy making for the critical infrastructure network are investigated in depth. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed approach is demonstrated on a simulated water supply system.

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Section: Analysis Of Response Strategy Making In Cismentioning

confidence: 99%

A hierarchical colored Petri net–based cyberattacks response strategy making approach for critical infrastructures

Zhu

Qin

Zhao

et al. 2020

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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“…SCADA systems were designed to work in a standalone way and relied on air-gapped networks and proprietary protocols for securing the system. Therefore, initial designs of SCADA never incorporated security features [2,3]. However in recent years, due to the expansion of business and need of central monitoring of distributed software, SCADA systems have evolved into sophisticated, complex open systems, connected to the Internet using advanced technology.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review

Yadav

Paul

2021

International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection

114

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“…Therefore, when a failure occurs, a cost is initiated that corresponds to the caused damage to the surrounding infrastructure and the loss of water (Hadzilacos et al, 2000;Pelletier et al, 2003). Financial resources are often limited (Chang and Hernandez, 2008;Marinoni et al, 2012;Papa et al, 2013), such that strategies need to be designed for operators of underground water supply networks to manage these pipe failure costs effectively (Kleiner et al, 1998) by means of rehabilitation, ranging from repairs (also called relining) to the complete replacement of pipes (Rehan et al, 2011). Repairs may be sufficient in the case of relatively small failures, postponing thereby the replacement.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pipe Replacement in a Water Supply Network: Coordinated Versus Uncoordinated Replacement and Budget Effects

Dijk¹,

Hendrix²

2016

Informatica

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Operators of underground water supply networks are challenged with pipe replacement decisions, because pipes are subject to increased failure rates as they age and financial resources are often limited. We study the optimal replacement time and optimal number of pipe replacements such that the expected failure cost and replacement cost are minimized, while satisfying a budget constraint and incorporating uncoordinated and coordinated replacement. Results show that coordinated replacement is economically preferred to uncoordinated replacement. It depends on the size of the budget whether the increase in the number of pipe replacements is sufficient to reduce the total expected failure cost.

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Securing wastewater facilities from accidental and intentional harm: A cost-benefit analysis

Cited by 9 publications

References 13 publications

A hierarchical colored Petri net–based cyberattacks response strategy making approach for critical infrastructures

A hierarchical colored Petri net–based cyberattacks response strategy making approach for critical infrastructures

Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review

Pipe Replacement in a Water Supply Network: Coordinated Versus Uncoordinated Replacement and Budget Effects

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