Securing Property Rights

Behrer, A. Patrick; Glaeser, Edward L.; Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.; Shleifer, Andrei

doi:10.1086/712733

Cited by 31 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 64 publications

(69 reference statements)

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“…In a modern society, the protection of property rights, including both possession and transfer, is typically delivered not only by courts and police, but also by administrative institutions, such as deed registration offices. Empirically, much attention has been devoted to the effectiveness of courts and regulators in protecting private property, including in cross-country contexts (e.g., Djankov et al 2003, Behrer et al 2020. Less is known about the role of administrative institutions that keep track of ownership and its transfer.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Without formal title, residents must rely on self-protection to assure unhindered enjoyment of their residence and land (Field 2005(Field , 2007, and have a limited incentive to invest in such informally owned property (De Soto 1989, Besley 1995. Only secure title can in principle provide protection against expropriation by armed bandits, powerful neighbors, and the grabbing hand of the state (Olson 1993, Shleifer and Vishny 1998, De Soto 2000, Behrer et al, 2020.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Measuring Property Rights Institutions

Djankov¹,

Glaeser²,

Perotti³

et al. 2020

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for helpful comments. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w27839.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring Property Rights Institutions

Djankov¹,

Glaeser²,

Perotti³

et al. 2020

Self Cite

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“…Contrary to this common wisdom, Behrer et al (2021) argued that formal ownership does not necessarily enhance government power: It can also place limits thereon. Without institutional constraints on the state's ability to intervene with property rights, political officials are prone to exploiting their power (Boettke and Candela 2020).…”

Section: The Effect Of Weakly Versus Strongly Defined Property Rights...mentioning

confidence: 89%

Political Divide, Weak Property Rights, and Infrastructure Provision: An Empirical Examination of Takings Decisions in Jerusalem

Levine‐Schnur¹

2021

Law Soc. Inq.

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In this article I use a unique hand-coded dataset of all expropriation exercises in Jerusalem over a twenty-five-year period to test the distribution of the expropriation burden across political communities. I identify the ethnoreligious group to which the impacted landowner belongs and the community that would benefit from the decision. I find that Palestinian property constitutes 38 percent of all land taken over the years, while only 10 percent of all land taken has been repurposed for their local community needs. Conversely, Jewish owners have contributed only 4 percent of all land taken while benefiting from 33 percent of the land taken for their community needs. I also find that land not owned by Jews has a higher propensity to be taken for citywide purposes by ten to twenty-three times than Jewish land, depending on the purpose and the type of property rights involved. This sharp gap can be attributed to the political power relations in the city. The case study enables me to test the relationship between weak property rights and infrastructure provision. As property rights are formally recorded and recognized selectively in some but not in all parts of the city, the article provides the first empirical evidence to the effect of weak property rights on the risk of expropriation. I find that the propensity for noncommunity purpose takings of nonformalized land for which Palestinians claim ownership but have no official records to is significantly higher when compared to formalized Palestinian land. This outcome contradicts the conventional wisdom in the literature that weak property rights help explain limited infrastructure development.

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“…In developing countries, weak judicial systems increase the transaction costs of enforcing contracts ( Behrer et al, 2021;Djankov et al, 2003 ). 35 In cases of disputes, delays and high judicial pendency could result in tenants continuing to occupy units for very long periods.…”

Section: Property Rights Framework Applied To Rentingmentioning

confidence: 99%