Securing IEC 61850

Falk, Herbert

doi:10.1109/pes.2008.4596335

Cited by 17 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…In this study, overall results are computed as approximate measurements and also compared with existing works [12-17, 23, 24]. As conclusion, the proposed development has great potential to secure the SCADA/DNP3 multicasting communication, which is not intended by existing developments [3,[32][33][34][35][38][39][40][41][42].…”

Section: Performance Evaluation and Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Meaning that, in unbalanced system, each and every node is able to initiate the communication with main node, while, in balance system, only main node is authorized to initiate the communication with connected subnodes in SCADA system [1][2][3]. The basic configuration and specifications are required whether main controller sends request to subcontroller or sub controller initiates the communication, and are considered at application layer of DNP3 protocol [34,35]. The proposed study employs a balance system in SCADA multicasting transmission and deploys the security before transmitting of bytes to open network(s).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Sensors Connectivity within SCADA Automation Environment and New Trends for Security Development during Multicasting Routing Transmission

Shahzad

Udagepola²,

Lee

et al. 2015

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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Section: Performance Evaluation and Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Sensors Connectivity within SCADA Automation Environment and New Trends for Security Development during Multicasting Routing Transmission

Shahzad

Udagepola²,

Lee

et al. 2015

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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“…Ozansoy et al in [7] proposed a publisher-subscriber communication model for satisfying the communications need of the IEC 61850 protocol. Falk [8] proposed securing the multicast authentication mechanisms of Generic Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) and Sampled Measured Values (SMV) messages, but without any implementation or practical details. Hong et al [9] performed an analysis of AES encryption, and SEED, MD5, and HMAC integrity.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Securing restricted publisher-subscriber communications in smart grid substations

Saxena

Grijalva

Choi

2018

2018 10th International Conference on Communication Systems &Amp; Networks (COMSNETS)

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Smart Grid applications require accurate and correct data transmission from publisher to subscribers with critical communication latency requirements. Since the smart grid is being supported by distributed communication networks, deployed using various wired and wireless technologies, including IP-based networks, securing the communication infrastructure is both critically important and challenging. In this paper, we propose a secure and efficient data delivery scheme, based on a restricted yet dynamic publisher-subscriber architecture, for the published messages from a publisher to the subscribers distributed in the smart grid network. The scheme ensures that the published message is delivered from an authentic publisher to only those authorized subscribers by verifying publisher's signature and access structure of all subscribers. Operation overheads are reduced by performing only one encryption and decryption or hashing per subscriber location using a proxy node as a remote terminal unit. Our analysis shows that the scheme is resistant against replay, man-in-the-middle, and impersonation attacks. Performance evaluation shows that the scheme can support 600 subscribers given the communication latency requirement of 3 ms. We provide the performance of the scheme under different scenarios, and observe that the efficiency of our scheme increases as the ratio of the geographical locations within a substation to the number of subscribers increases.

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“…Recently, smart grid researchers and standards bodies have developed technological requirements and solutions for protecting cyber infrastructure (Watts, 2003;Committee, 2007;Pietre-Cambacedes et al, 2007Endoh, 2008;Falk, 2008;McDonald, 2008;Ericsoon, 2009). However, grid protection remains daunting to asset owners because of resources limitations (Madani and Witham, 2008;Mertz, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards modelling the impact of cyber attacks on a smart grid

Kundur¹,

Feng²,

Mashayekh³

et al. 2011

IJSN

112

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This paper provides an introduction to cyber attack impact analysis in the smart grid and highlights existing research in the field. We present an impact analysis framework where we focus on the model synthesis stage where both cyber and physical grid entity relationships are modelled as directed graphs. Each node of the graph has associated state information that is governed by dynamical system equations that model the physics of the interaction (for electrical grid components) or functionality (for cyber grid elements). We illustrate how cause-effect relationships can be conveniently expressed for both analysis and extension to large-scale smart grid systems.

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Securing IEC 61850

Cited by 17 publications

References 0 publications

The Sensors Connectivity within SCADA Automation Environment and New Trends for Security Development during Multicasting Routing Transmission

The Sensors Connectivity within SCADA Automation Environment and New Trends for Security Development during Multicasting Routing Transmission

Securing restricted publisher-subscriber communications in smart grid substations

Towards modelling the impact of cyber attacks on a smart grid

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