Securing CAN Traffic on J1939 Networks

Daily, Jeremy; Nnaji, David; Ettlinger, Ben

doi:10.14722/autosec.2021.23031

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…The existing art covers the topic of autonomous trucks driving in-reverse from an algorithm and controls perspective [41] [42] but not from a trailer ECU integration, or systemsthinking point of view. Non-Autonomous Tractor communication art includes different solutions such as combining CANopen and J1939 networks [43], and securing and encrypting the J1939 and diagnostics traffic on the tractor side as Daily et al presented in [44] [45]. Power Line Carrier (PLC, SAE 2497) is being used as a low-speed communication bus between the trailer and the tractor which is not suitable for AT applications due to the bitrate limitation in PLC, where the preamble bitrate is 8772 bits per second and the data body bitrate is 10,000 bits per second [46].…”

Section: G Trailer Applications and Communication With The Tractormentioning

confidence: 99%

ECU over Named Data Networking (ECUoNDN): Data Management and Integration with Heterogenous Automotive Networks

Elhadeedy¹,

Daily²

2022

Preprint

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<p> Abstract—Autonomous vehicles use variety of automotive communication protocols in order for different Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to intra-communicate such as Controller Area Network (CAN), FlexRay or Ethernet to address the requirements of ultra-low latency and higher bandwidth due to the increased number of sensors. This leads to an increased number of wires, complexity and weight of the harness needed to connect each ECU to the network. In the case of an autonomous tractor trailer with autonomy sensors, tractor-trailer communication harness with new wires to be able to communicate with additional communication protocols at the tractor side and the trailer harness will be required to be plugged or unplugged every time a trailer gets coupled or uncoupled with a tractor. In this paper, we propose a new network architecture and intra-communication link for an autonomous tractor trailer ECU with additional autonomy sensors to reduce the number of wires needed to communicate different data types to the autonomous tractor network buses to two wires or eliminate the wires in case of a conventional tractor-trailer using a wireless medium, in addition to a method to manage multi-protocol data transfer between the trailer and the tractor. We conducted an experiment to evaluate the performance of Named Data Networking (NDN) when used in communication between ECUs that had positive outcome and indicated the high potential compatibility of NDN with vehicular communication. 1 </p>

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Section: G Trailer Applications and Communication With The Tractormentioning

confidence: 99%

ECU over Named Data Networking (ECUoNDN): Data Management and Integration with Heterogenous Automotive Networks

Elhadeedy¹,

Daily²

2022

Preprint

Self Cite

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“…Securing CAN is a significant step toward ensuring that the critical systems which communicate on the bus are protected from cyber and physical attacks. Approaches toward CAN security include deploying an intrusion detection system (IDS) [7], [8] on the network to detect indications of attacks over the CAN bus, or using cryptographic techniques [9]- [11] and authentications mechanisms [12]- [14]. Although an IDS can be adopted without perturbing bus performance [15], the latter approaches cannot be easily applied to in-vehicle networks due to computational constraints and real-time requirements [16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Framework for Consistent and Repeatable Controller Area Network IDS Evaluation

Agbaje¹,

Anjum²,

Mitra³

et al. 2022

Proceedings Fourth International Workshop on Automotive and Autonomous Vehicle Security

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The landscape of automotive vehicle attack surfaces continues to grow, and vulnerabilities in the controller area network (CAN) expose vehicles to cyber-physical risks and attacks that can endanger the safety of passengers and pedestrians. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) for CAN have emerged as a key mitigation approach for these risks, but uniform methods to compare proposed IDS techniques are lacking. In this paper, we present a framework for comparative performance analysis of state-of-the-art IDSs for CAN bus to provide a consistent methodology to evaluate and assess proposed approaches. This framework relies on previously published datasets comprising message logs recorded from a real vehicle CAN bus coupled with traditional classifier performance metrics to reduce the discrepancies that arise when comparing IDS approaches from disparate sources.

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“…The question is then how to secure the CAN bus in a way that supports the decades of systems we already have. One method is adding authentication, but cryptographic mechanisms would impact bus performance, and limit possible bus configurations [26], [31], [16], [12]. This makes it impractical for existing systems, especially with J1939 running at 250kb/s.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting CAN Attacks on J1939 and NMEA 2000 Networks

Rogers,

Weigand,

Happa

et al. 2022

IEEE Trans. Dependable and Secure Comput.

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J1939 is a networking layer built on top of the widespread CAN bus used for communication between different subsystems within a vehicle. The J1939 and NMEA 2000 protocols standardize data enrichment for these subsystems, and are used for trucks, weapon systems, naval vessels, and other industrial systems. Practical security solutions for existing CAN based communication systems are notoriously difficult because of the lack of cryptographic capabilities of the devices involved. In this paper we propose a novel intrusion detection system (IDS) for J1939 and NMEA 2000 networks. Our IDS (CANDID) combines timing analysis with a packet manipulation detection system and data analysis. This data analysis enables us to capture the state of the vehicle, detect messages with irregular timing intervals, and take advantage of the dependencies between different Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to restrict even the most advanced attacker. Our IDS is deployed and tested on multiple vehicles, and has demonstrated greater accuracy and detection capabilities than previous work.

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Securing CAN Traffic on J1939 Networks

Cited by 9 publications

References 2 publications

ECU over Named Data Networking (ECUoNDN): Data Management and Integration with Heterogenous Automotive Networks

ECU over Named Data Networking (ECUoNDN): Data Management and Integration with Heterogenous Automotive Networks

A Framework for Consistent and Repeatable Controller Area Network IDS Evaluation

Detecting CAN Attacks on J1939 and NMEA 2000 Networks

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