Secure Two-Party Computation in a Quantum World

Büscher, Niklas; Demmler, Daniel; Karvelas, Nikolaos P.; Katzenbeisser, Stefan; Krämer, Juliane; Rathee, Deevashwer; Schneider, Thomas; Struck, Patrick

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-57808-4_23

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…The comparison of each main family, today versus PQC effectiveness, is listed in the following table (see Table 1). Some other modernized implementations, such as Post-Quantum Yao and PQ-QT [6], still fall in the main family here.…”

Section: Previous Quantum Resistance Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Quantum-Resistant Network for Classical Client Compatibility

Lin

Fuh

2021

ITC

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Quantum computing is no longer a thing of the future. Shor’s algorithm proved that a quantum computer couldtraverse key of factoring problems in polynomial time. Because the time-complexity of the exhaustive keysearch for quantum computing has not reliably exceeded the reasonable expiry of crypto key validity, it is believedthat current cryptography systems built on top of computational security are not quantum-safe. Quantumkey distribution fundamentally solves the problem of eavesdropping; nevertheless, it requires quantumpreparatory work and quantum-network infrastructure, and these remain unrealistic with classical computers.In transitioning to a mature quantum world, developing a quantum-resistant mechanism becomes a stringentproblem. In this research, we innovatively tackled this challenge using a non-computational difficulty schemewith zero-knowledge proof in order to achieve repellency against quantum computing cryptanalysis attacks foruniversal classical clients.

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Section: Previous Quantum Resistance Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, the correctness of the scheme is satisfied when C←Eval ε (k e , f, c) ↔ f (m1, m2, … mt) = Dec ε (k d , c). (6) In short, the operation F ε in ciphertext space, C, which is constructed by the encryption after the completion of f on its corresponding plaintext space, M, can be denoted as…”

Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum-Resistant Network for Classical Client Compatibility

Lin

Fuh

2021

ITC

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“…The motivation behind this trend is the need to mitigate the potential threat of future quantum computers to current public key cryptosystems. In order to build a post‐quantum secure two‐party computing protocol, Büscher et al 22 proposed a lattice‐based OT protocol in 2020 and later implemented a post‐quantum variant of Yao's protocol. In 2022, You et al 23 developed a novel NTRUEncrypt‐based S2PC protocol using the NTRUEncrypt‐based OT protocol introduced in the literature 24 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Post‐quantum secure two‐party computing protocols against malicious adversaries

Huo,

Zhao,

Qin

et al. 2023

Concurrency and Computation

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SummarySecure two‐party computation allows a pair of parties to compute a function together while keeping their inputs private. Ultimately, each party receives only its own correct output. In this paper, a post‐quantum secure two‐party computation protocol is proposed that can be used to effectively block malicious parties. The protocol solves the problems of traditional protocols based on garbled circuits, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks, high communication costs and low computational efficiency. The input garbled keys of the circuit constructor is structured as a Learning with Error (LWE) equation, enabling the circuit constructor to employ a zero‐knowledge proof that demonstrates the uniformity of inputs across all circuits.In the key transfer phase, an LWE‐based batch single‐choice cut‐and‐choose oblivious transfer is proposed to avoid selective failure attacks. In addition, the protocol employs a penalty mechanism to detect if the circuit constructor has generated an incorrect circuit. We have compared the communication overhead of this protocol with three other secure two‐party computation protocols based on Cut‐and‐Choose technology. The analytical results show that this protocol has the best error probability and is resilient to quantum attacks under the malicious adversary model. In addition, with appropriate parameters, the protocol is able to reduce its communication bandwidth by an average of 40.41%.

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