Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments

Abstract

and WashU. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

The optimal assortativity of teams inside the firm

“…with the simpler sentence: "We believe this restriction is plausible in environments in which peer evaluation is ineffective at generating reliable reports. As previously mentioned, two explanations for why this may be the case are that peer reports may be subject to collusion and reporting parties may fear retaliation by their co‐workers (see Che and Yoo (2001), who make a similar noncontractability assumption, for a discussion of the former point and Chassang and Zehnder (2019) for recent work related to the latter point). An interesting, though challenging, direction for future research would be to study whether the distortion we identify holds in a dynamic contracting environment in which information about one's teammate arrives over time and the manager demands contracts to be robust to collusion and/or that individual reports cannot be identified by the manager's chosen matching.…”