Secure software architectures

Moriconi, Mark; Qian, Xiaolei; Riemenschneider, R.A.; Gong, Li

doi:10.1109/secpri.1997.601320

Cited by 36 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…First, we wanted to determine whether implementation-level SDTP architectural descriptions could be derived for the three implementation approaches defined in our earlier paper [8] by the application of transformations that introduce only faithful interpretations. While we do not have a definitive answer to this question, our experience suggests that such a derivation would be difficult or impossible.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 A priori, it was not known what percentage of the design history encoded in the X/Open DTP hierarchy could be reused in the SDTP hierarchy. We therefore developed implementation-level descriptions of the three abstract architectures for SDTP that we have described in an earlier publication [8]. It turned out that over 90% of the design decisions made during the implementation of each of the three SDTP architectures could be based on decisions recorded in DTP hierarchy; conversely, every design decision in the DTP hierarchy was reused in the development of every one of the three SDTP hierarchies.…”

Section: Defining the Sdtp Hierarchymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Specifically, we added the constraint that the system must satisfy a multilevel secure access control policy. Our basic approach to defining a family of architectures that satisfy the extended requirements was described in an earlier paper [8]. This paper is devoted to describing our experiences following that approach to its logical conclusion: an implemented architecture for secure distributed transaction processing that has been proven secure.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Secure Interoperation of Secure Distributed Databases

Gilham¹,

Riemenschneider²,

Stavridou³

1999

FM’99 — Formal Methods

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Abstract. This paper describes the process of implementing an architecture for secure distributed transaction processing, the process of verifying that it has the desired security properties, and the implementation that resulted. The implementation and verification processes provided us with valuable experience relevant to answering several questions posed by our research on transformational development of architectures. To what extent can implementation-level architectural descriptions be derived from abstract description via application of transformations that preserve a broad class of properties, which includes satisfaction of various access control policies? To what extent can a formal derivation of a non-secure implementation-level distributed transaction processing architecture be reused in derivation of a secure architecture? Are the transformation verification techniques that we have developed sufficient for verifying a collection of transformations adequate for implementing com-plex secure architecture? Do our architecture hierarchies effectively fill the gap between abstract, intellectually manageable models of a complex architecture and the actual implementation? Exploring the answers to these questions resulted in a reference implementation of an architecture for secure distributed transaction processing, and an independently interesting demonstration instance of the reference implementation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Defining the Sdtp Hierarchymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Secure Interoperation of Secure Distributed Databases

Gilham¹,

Riemenschneider²,

Stavridou³

1999

FM’99 — Formal Methods

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“…One product of that research is a dynamic architecture for secure distributed transaction processing (SDTP) [3,10]. SDTP was designed by writing a simple abstract description of the architecture, showing that the description guarantees the desired security properties, successively refining the abstract description until a directly implementable concrete description results, and showing that each refinement step preserves satisfaction of the security policy.…”

Section: Designing For Dependabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Automated Dynamic Assembly of Dependable System Architectures

Riemenschneider¹

2004

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“…Examples of a component include: a single button in a graphical user interface, a small interest calculator, an interface to a database manager. Components can be deployed on di erent servers in a network and communicate with each other for needed services [10,3]. A component runs within a context called a container.…”

Section: Distributed Component Object Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Role-based access control in DCOM

Ahn

2000

Journal of Systems Architecture

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The explosive growth of the Web, the increasing popularity of PCs and the advances in high-speed network access have brought distributed computing into the mainstream. To simplify network programming and to realize componentbased software architecture, distributed object models have emerged as standards. One of those models is distributed component object model (DCOM) which is a protocol that enables software components to communicate directly over a network in a reliable, and e cient manner. In this paper, we investigate an aspect of DCOM concerning software architecture and security mechanism. Also, we describe the concept of role-based access control (RBAC) which began with multi-user and multi-application on-line systems pioneered in the 1970s. And we investigate how we can enforce the role-based access control as a security provider within DCOM, specially in access security policy. Ó

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Secure software architectures

Cited by 36 publications

References 12 publications

Secure Interoperation of Secure Distributed Databases

Secure Interoperation of Secure Distributed Databases

Automated Dynamic Assembly of Dependable System Architectures

Role-based access control in DCOM

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