2022
DOI: 10.1109/tits.2021.3129484
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Secure Privacy-Preserving V2V Communication in 5G-V2X Supporting Network Slicing

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Cited by 17 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The UAV has a complex architecture and most of the information regarding measures in place is confidential, so it is difficult to identify which threat is more dangerous to a UAV that needs to be modelled at utmost priority [106]. Moreover, there has been wide research for modelling the security and privacy of vehicleto-vehicle (V2V) [117], Vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) [118] and Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) [119]. But threat modelling techniques (such as STRIDE, LINDDUN) are not sufficient for securing V2V, V2I and V2X because they require the autonomy approach [120] to deal with privacy and security vulnerabilities.…”
Section: Challenges and Difficulties In Conducting Threat Modelling F...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The UAV has a complex architecture and most of the information regarding measures in place is confidential, so it is difficult to identify which threat is more dangerous to a UAV that needs to be modelled at utmost priority [106]. Moreover, there has been wide research for modelling the security and privacy of vehicleto-vehicle (V2V) [117], Vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) [118] and Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) [119]. But threat modelling techniques (such as STRIDE, LINDDUN) are not sufficient for securing V2V, V2I and V2X because they require the autonomy approach [120] to deal with privacy and security vulnerabilities.…”
Section: Challenges and Difficulties In Conducting Threat Modelling F...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, in such a heterogeneous network, the risks of vehicle operation safety, data privacy and network security complicate the security of V2X communication. Network security is the basic premise for ensuring the operational safety of vehicles and an important fulcrum for realizing data privacy, making network security a top priority for ensuring V2X security [4]. Unfortunately, the ultra-large scale of the 6G V2X network further expands the attack surface of traditional mobile networks.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The situation gets worse with the introduction of network slicing. Indeed, combining 5G-V2X with NS will increase attack severity and open up a network slicing attack vector to CAVs [3]. We can classify these attacks into two main categories: (i) intra-slice attacks in which the attacker(s) and the target(s) belong to the same V2X Network Slice (V2X-NS), and (ii) inter-slice attacks in which the attacker(s) and/or the target(s) belong to different V2X-NSs.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%