2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) 2011
DOI: 10.1109/icc.2011.5963292
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Secure Mutual Authentication Protocols for Mobile Multi-Hop Relay WiMAX Networks against Rogue Base/Relay Stations

Abstract: Mobile multi-hop relay (MMR) WiMAX networks have attracted lots of interest in the wireless communication industry recently because of its scalable coverage, improved data rates and relatively low cost. However, security of MMR WiMAX networks is the main challenge. In this paper, we first identify a possible attack on MMR WiMAX networks in which a rogue base station (BS) or relay station (RS) can get authenticated and gain control over the connections. We also show that the current standard does not address th… Show more

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Cited by 17 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 13 publications
(14 reference statements)
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“…In our previous conference paper [7], we focused on addressing the rogue BS and rogue RS attacks in MMR WiMAX networks with centralized authentication schemes and designed a set of protocols to address the aforementioned attacks. However, a formal verification we conducted later using the Scyther tool [8] shows that our previous protocols allow for a new attack called suppress-replay attack, which exploits the asynchronization of time stamps in BS and RS.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In our previous conference paper [7], we focused on addressing the rogue BS and rogue RS attacks in MMR WiMAX networks with centralized authentication schemes and designed a set of protocols to address the aforementioned attacks. However, a formal verification we conducted later using the Scyther tool [8] shows that our previous protocols allow for a new attack called suppress-replay attack, which exploits the asynchronization of time stamps in BS and RS.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…PKM protocol uses RSA-1024 bit asymmetric key encryption along with one way and three way handshakes techniques to achieve authentication [5]. The extension of PKM and improved secure network authentication protocol (ISNAP) for IEEE 802.16 is presented in [8] and [9]. However, these approaches suffer from the distribution of public keys.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, the security threats and countermeasures discussed in [128] and the security threats in multihop WiMAX networks [129] have been investigated and analyzed, which are summarized in Table 3.2. [76], [131], [134], [135] and [136].…”
Section: A Comprehensive Taxonomy Of Various Attacks and Countermeasumentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For these attacks, the attackers modify and reply the key request and response message during authorization and SA in Figure 1. For rouge RS, the attacker act as a fake RS node [129]. Other two attacks are described in our previous work [46].…”
Section: A Comprehensive Taxonomy Of Various Attacks and Countermeasumentioning
confidence: 99%