Secure key rate of the BB84 protocol using finite sample bits

Sano, Yousuke; Matsumoto, Ryutaroh; Uyematsu, Tomohiko

doi:10.1088/1751-8113/43/49/495302

Cited by 13 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…(A.8) Due to the finite post-processing size we include statistical fluctuations of expected QBER and visibility values, given by analysis based on interval estimation. For parameter estimation based on sub-sampling, it is [40,41] δ Q = 1 + η PE (n PP − 1) (η PE n PP ) 2 log 1 PE (A.9)…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A fast and versatile quantum key distribution system with hardware key distillation and wavelength multiplexing

et al. 2014

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We present a compactly integrated, 625 MHz clocked coherent one-way quantum key distribution system which continuously distributes secret keys over an optical fibre link. To support high secret key rates, we implemented a fast hardware key distillation engine which allows for key distillation rates up to 4 Mbps in real time. The system employs wavelength multiplexing in order to run over only a single optical fibre. Using fast gated InGaAs single photon detectors, we reliably distribute secret keys with a rate above 21 kbps over 25 km of optical fibre. We optimized the system considering a security analysis that respects finite-keysize effects, authentication costs and system errors for a security parameter of ε QKD = 4 × 10 −9 .

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A fast and versatile quantum key distribution system with hardware key distillation and wavelength multiplexing

et al. 2014

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“…However, in the realistic formalism. Scarani et al [31] and Sano et al [32] also treated the finiteness problem only for collective attack. Recently, using Rennerʼs formalism, Tomamichel et al [33] derived an upper bound formula for the security parameter with finite coding length.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security analysis of the decoy method with the Bennett–Brassard 1984 protocol for finite key lengths

Hayashi

Nakayama

2014

New J. Phys.

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This paper provides a formula for the sacrifice bit-length for privacy amplification with the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol for finite key lengths, when we employ the decoy method. Using the formula, we can guarantee the security parameter for a realizable quantum key distribution system. The key generation rates with finite key lengths are numerically evaluated. The proposed method improves the existing key generation rate even in the asymptotic setting.In this paper, when Aliceʼs basis is the same as Bobʼs basis, the basis is called matched.Content from this work may be used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 licence. Any further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the title of the work, journal citation and DOI.setting, there are two obstacles for security. One is the noise of the communication quantum channel. Due to the presence of the noise, the eavesdropper can obtain part of the raw keys information behind the noise. The second one is the imperfection of the photon source. If the sender sends the two-photon state instead of the single photon state, the eavesdropper can obtain one photon so that she can obtain information perfectly. Many realized QKD systems have been realized with weak coherent pulses. In this case, the photon number of transmitted pulses obeys the Poisson distribution, whose average is given by the intensity μ of the pulse. The first problem can be resolved by the application of error correction and random privacy amplification to the raw keys [2][3][4][5]. In the privacy amplification stage, we amplify the security of the raw keys by sacrificing part of our raw keys. The security of the final keys depends on the decreasing number of keys in the privacy amplification stage, which is called the sacrifice bit-length. Shor-Preskill [2] and Mayers [3] showed that this method gives the secure keys asymptotically when the rate of the sacrifice bit-length is greater than a certain amount. In order to solve the second problem, Gottesman-Lo-Lütkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) [6] extended their result to the case when the photon source has an imperfection. However, GLLPʼs result assumes the fractions of respective photon number pulses among received pulses. Indeed, there is a possibility that the eavesdropper can control the receiverʼs detection rate depending on the photon number because pulses with the different photon number can be distinguished by the eavesdropper. In order to solve this problem, we need to estimate the detection rate of the single photon pulses. Hwang proposed the decoy method to estimate the detection rate [7]. This method has been improved by many researchers [8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16]. In this method, in order to estimate the detection rates, the sender randomly chooses several kinds of pulses with different intensities. The first kind of pulses are the signal pulses, which generate raw keys. The other kind of pulses are the decoy pulses, which are used for estimating the operation by the eavesdropper and have a di...

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“…However, before this research, the key rates with finite qubits in the B92 protocol had not been reported, as far as the authors know. In this paper, we report the key rates with finite qubits, based on the analytic framework introduced by Scarani and Renner [12] and our previous researches [7], [11]. We stress that the assumption in our paper is the same as [12], and in particular we assume the collective attack instead of the coherent attack.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%