2022
DOI: 10.1109/access.2022.3145959
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Secure ECC-Based Three-Factor Mutual Authentication Protocol for Telecare Medical Information System

Abstract: In the recent COVID-19 situation, Telecare Medical Information System (TMIS) is attracting attention. TMIS is one of the technologies used in Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) and can provide patients with a variety of remote healthcare services. In TMIS environments, sensitive data of patients are communicated via an open channel. An adversary may attempt various security attacks including impersonation, replay, and forgery attacks. Therefore, numberous authentication schemes have been suggested to provide se… Show more

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Cited by 63 publications
(23 citation statements)
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References 44 publications
(56 reference statements)
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“…ECC, which employs an elliptic curve over a large finite field, provides better security performance with smaller key sizes than existing public-key cryptography techniques [30], [31]. Assume that p is a large prime, F p represents prime fields, u, r ∈ F p , and 4u 3 + 27r 2 ̸ = 0 (mod p).…”
Section: B Elliptic Curve Cryptographymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…ECC, which employs an elliptic curve over a large finite field, provides better security performance with smaller key sizes than existing public-key cryptography techniques [30], [31]. Assume that p is a large prime, F p represents prime fields, u, r ∈ F p , and 4u 3 + 27r 2 ̸ = 0 (mod p).…”
Section: B Elliptic Curve Cryptographymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…• A has a dictionary of the identity and password, and can attempt to guess a legitimate user's identity and password simultaneously. • An attacker can attempt security attacks such as session key disclosure, MITM, and impersonation attacks [28], [29].…”
Section: B Threat Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…• The adversary can obtain session-specific temporary information, such as a random nonce generated in each session [31]. • The adversary can extract the sensitive information stored in the user smart card or the home device using a power analysis attack [32]. • The adversary can register as a legitimate user of the smart home.…”
Section: E Threat Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%