Secure Computer System: Unified Exposition and Multics Interpretation

Bell, David E.; Padula, L.J. La

doi:10.21236/ada023588

Cited by 1,408 publications

(890 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…We give the following definitions referring to the literature [1], [3], [4], [9], [10]. Definition 1: S denotes the set of subjects.…”

Section: Model Elementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Table 1 shows the requirements of BLP model and Biba model on the sensitivity label function. Partly referring the description of [1], [3], [4], [9], [10], we give the decisions of access authorization and dynamic adjustment rules of sensitive labels. In "Read rule", if the sensitivity labels of subjects and objects meet the requirements of BLP and Biba model simultaneously, the direct authorization to operations and adjustment of the access historical labels will be performed.…”

Section: Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Application-Oriented Confidentiality and Integrity Dynamic Union Security Model Based on MLS Policy

Xue

2012

IEICE Trans. Inf. & Syst.

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SUMMARYWe propose a new security model based on MLS Policy to achieve a better security performance on confidentiality, integrity and availability. First, it realizes a combination of BLP model and Biba model through a two-dimensional independent adjustment of integrity and confidentiality. And, the subject's access range is adjusted dynamically according to the security label of related objects and the subject's access history. Second, the security level of the trusted subject is extended to writing and reading privilege range respectively, following the principle of least privilege. Third, it adjusts the objects' security levels after adding confidential information to prevent the information disclosure. Fourth, it uses application-oriented logic to protect specific applications to avoid the degradation of security levels. Thus, it can ensure certain applications operate smoothly. Lastly, examples are presented to show the effectiveness and usability of the proposed model.

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“…We give the following definitions referring to the literature [1], [3], [4], [9], [10]. Definition 1: S denotes the set of subjects.…”

Section: Model Elementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Application-Oriented Confidentiality and Integrity Dynamic Union Security Model Based on MLS Policy

Xue

2012

IEICE Trans. Inf. & Syst.

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“…If we specify such a. requirement for all user representatives and for all operations we will obtain the requirements of the multi-level security policy of the Bell La.Padula. model [BL75].…”

Section: Security Requirementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The formulas of the logic offer a powerful formalism to specify access control policies, as well as, information fl.ow policies. Using the logic we can specify well known security policies in a uniform manner, for instance, the multi-level security policy [BL75], or the Chinese Wall policy [BN89], as well as, application specific security policies. The model used in our approach may be characterized as information flow model with special support for data integrity based on a computation model supporting concurrency.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Matching Security Policies to Application Needs

Eckert

1995

IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology

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The issue of developing complex secure systems is still a great challenge. We claim that in contra.st to the well known bottom-up oriented approaches secure concurrent systems should be developed top-down starting with a formal top-level specification. A framework for developing secure systems is needed, which offers means to specify security requirements adapted to the specific demands of application a.rea.s. In addition, a.n appropriate security model is needed to formally describe the behavior and the security properties of systems. We will present a uniform framework which is appropriate to match security policies to application needs. Secure concurrent systems a.re modeled with two different levels of abstraction. The action model provides a sound and fine-grained ha.sis to formalize security properties of the system. In order to ea.se system modeling we introduce the object security model by systematically coarsening the action model. In addition to our security model we will present a. security requirement logic. Security policies tailored to the specific requirements of applications may by specified with the formulas of the logic. The security requirement logic allows to specify different security policies such a.s access control and information flow policies in a. uniform way, and allows to com pa.re these policies.

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“…⊥ represents the no-access permission and represents full-access permission. In general, an entity with permission p ∈ PERM implicitly has permission p ≤ p, where ≤ is the partial order relation on the semiring S. Encoding permissions using a partial order is common, for example, [Bell and Padula, 1976] is based on a partial order of security classes, Java Security permissions are partially ordered [Gong, 1999] and [Bharadwaj and Baras, 2003] codifies Role and Permission lattices within a semiring.…”

Section: Access Configurationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning about Secure Interoperation Using Soft Constraints

Bistarelli

Foley

O’Sullivan

Formal Aspects in Security and Trust

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The security of a network configuration is based not just on the security of its individual components and their direct interconnections, but also on the potential for systems to interoperate indirectly across network routes. Such interoperation has been shown to provide the potential for circuitous paths across a network that violate security. In this paper we propose a constraint-based framework for representing access control configurations of systems. The secure reconfiguration of a system is depicted as a constraint satisfaction problem.

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Secure Computer System: Unified Exposition and Multics Interpretation

Cited by 1,408 publications

References 6 publications

Application-Oriented Confidentiality and Integrity Dynamic Union Security Model Based on MLS Policy

Application-Oriented Confidentiality and Integrity Dynamic Union Security Model Based on MLS Policy

Matching Security Policies to Application Needs

Reasoning about Secure Interoperation Using Soft Constraints

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