‘Secular Retaliation’: A Case Study of Integralist Populism, Anti-Muslim Discourse, and (Il)liberal Discourse on Secularism in Contemporary France

Nilsson, Per-Erik

doi:10.1080/21567689.2015.1012160

Cited by 33 publications

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“…These phenomena certainly can (and probably they have already done it) create the environment and the overall socio-political context for developing negative attitudes toward Muslims and Islam in the West as well as its satellite countries (which Croatia certainly is). This is also supported by a number of recent papers in (Western) Europe addressing the theme of Islam and Muslims (Adida et al 2010;Bleich 2009;Carr and Haynes 2013;Ciftci 2012;Elchardus and Spruyt 2014;Fetzer and Soper 2003;Field 2007;González et al 2008;Mandel 2014;Nilsson 2015;Savelkoul et al 2012;Spruyt and Elchardus 2012;Strabac and Listhaug 2008;Wike and Grim 2010). Many of them refer to the increased values of negative attitudes toward Muslims in Europe, which can be brought in the context of immigration and terrorism, poor economic conditions, the cultural heritage of communism and the lack of democratic tradition in post-communist countries (Jeong 2017).…”

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confidence: 85%

Impact of Religious Self-Identification and Church Attendance on Social Distance toward Muslims

2019

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In the context of our work, we want to point out how religion has multiple social functions and as such, under certain circumstances, can serve as a fertile soil for distance and closeness. The aim of this study was to explore the impact of religious self-identification and church attendance on social distance toward Muslims. We applied a questionnaire to students of the University of Split, the city which is geographically in vicinity of the complex of ethnic and religious context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The results showed that religious self-identification and church attendance significantly influence the level of social distance toward Muslims. Believers showed a significantly higher level of social distance, in comparison to respondents who belong but not believe, and others. Respondents who attend church daily or once a week have also a higher level of social distance in comparison to respondents who attend church monthly or rarely and those who never attend church. We have tried to explain the reasons for such research findings, relying on various national, cultural, religious and psychological factors that have been present in the last twenty years after the war in this region.

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confidence: 85%

Impact of Religious Self-Identification and Church Attendance on Social Distance toward Muslims

2019

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“…First, boundary work is a dynamic process involving a whole array of social actors who are not necessarily in accord with one another regarding boundary configuration and act to advocate or reinforce their own social groups’ entitlement to setting the parameters of symbolic demarcation and challenge others’ (e.g., Ahmad ; Edgell et al. ; Edgell and Tranby ; Nilsson ; Onwuegnuchulam and Mtshali ; Sayegh ; Vaitheespara ). In China, the authoritarian party‐state has positioned itself to prescribe ideological discourses on national identity.…”

Section: Theoretical and Empirical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contesting Chineseness: An Examination of Religion and National Identity in Mainland China

Jun

Gao

2018

Scientific Study of Religion

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For citizens of many countries around the world, religion is a necessary—though often contested—component of their national identity. From the vantage point of the symbolic boundaries approach, we argue that the Chinese government and various other social actors are in contestation to define “Chineseness” in religious terms. Using data from the 2007 Spiritual Life Study of Chinese Residents, this study explores the extent to which religion functions as a constitutive part of Chinese national identity. We find that the effectiveness of the Chinese government's demarcation of the symbolic boundaries around Chineseness related to religion varies across religious groups. Believers of each religion are likely to be strong advocates for their own religion's connection to Chinese national identity. Among the religions, traditional Chinese religions tend to demonstrate a stronger affinity with one another than with Christianity. Daoists are a particularly strong contestant in aligning Daoism with Chineseness, to the extent that they discredit the other religions’ suitability for the Chinese. We discuss the implications of these findings and point out directions for future research.

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“…2 Drawing on discourse theory (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000;Torfing, 2005), I more specifically set out to discuss, to quote Whitney Phillips and Ryan M. Milner (2020: 8), "the underlying tonal, behavioral, and aesthetic characteristics" of sardonic irony -as in the case with the Orcish invasion -to assess its political function as an uncivil discursive practice. The analysis is explorative and argumentative and discusses in detail a handful of examples from voices of the French post-fascist media ecology and party politics; these examples are illustrative of findings in my earlier research on post-fascist movements and discourse in contemporary France (Nilsson, 2015;. While the generalisability of this analysis should of course be treated with caution, it is my contention that they will encourage further exploration of uncivility from this perspective and lay the basis for more thorough qualitative and quantitative analyses.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“The new extreme right”: Uncivility, irony, and displacement in the French re-information sphere

Nilsson

2021

Nordicom Review

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Contemporary France is a prolific arena for post-fascist actors, parties, and movements. Self-proclaimed alternative news outlets and publishing houses serve as forums for information and mobilisation, through various strategies, to resist an alleged onslaught by the enemies of the nation and its people: multiculturalism, feminism, political correctness, political corruption, and civilisational decay. In this article, I explore uncivility as a discursive logic within the French post-fascist media-ecology, focusing on the conspicuous use of irony and discursive displacement. More specifically, I discuss how sardonic irony as an uncivil discursive strategy is employed to navigate the legal boundaries of free speech and how discursive displacement, coupled with irony, is used as an affective identificatory technique in post-fascist discourse.

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‘Secular Retaliation’: A Case Study of Integralist Populism, Anti-Muslim Discourse, and (Il)liberal Discourse on Secularism in Contemporary France

Cited by 33 publications

References 0 publications

Impact of Religious Self-Identification and Church Attendance on Social Distance toward Muslims

Impact of Religious Self-Identification and Church Attendance on Social Distance toward Muslims

Contesting Chineseness: An Examination of Religion and National Identity in Mainland China

“The new extreme right”: Uncivility, irony, and displacement in the French re-information sphere

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