Secret Keys from Parity Bits in the Satellite Setting

Lietzén, Jari; Tirkkonen, Olav; Vehkalahti, Roope

doi:10.1109/isit50566.2022.9834762

Cited by 1 publication

(4 citation statements)

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“…Our approach is an application of the satellite model for secret key agreement, where a satellite is sending random bits and the legitimate users try to agree on a secret key while an eavesdropper receives the same bits, possibly through a better channel than the legitimate users [19]. We are proposing the use of Two-way Protocol with Parity bit Reconciliation (TPPR) [35], first introduced in QKD setting in [29], for key generation.…”

Section: B Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The parity-check protocol (PCP) by Maurer [20], [36] is a prototypical advantage distillation protocol. We demonstrated in [35] that TPPR, first introduced in QKD setting in [29], is able to outperform the information theoretic bound limiting the performance of all one-way protocols. In TPPR, parity checking is used for advantage distillation as in PCP, but instead of discarding parity bits after each advantage distillation round, key bits are collected from error corrected parity bits.…”

Section: Key Generation From Correlated Signalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…TPPR [35] differs from PCP in that the parity bits used for advantage distillation are error corrected in secrecy, and key is gathered from them. After M rounds of parity bit construction, the remaining bits are error corrected, as in PCP, considered as a round M + 1 in the protocol.…”

Section: Key Generation From Correlated Signalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In privacy amplification, Eve's information about the collected key is removed. The key rate for TPPR is a sum over rounds [35] (10) where…”

Section: Key Generation From Correlated Signalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Secret Key Generation Between Ambient Backscatter Devices

Lietzén

Tirkkonen

2023

IEEE Access

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We analyze secret key generation between ambient backscatter devices where the channel between an ambient transmitter and the backscatter devices is used as a source of randomness. The devices do not need to estimate or measure the channel between themselves, which greatly simplifies the gathering of raw key material. We analyze the eavesdropper's mutual information based on fundamental principles and apply privacy amplification to remove any information that the eavesdropper overheard during the error correction phase. We show how the legitimate users can estimate the eavesdropper's knowledge and trade off between achievable key rate and the eavesdropper's knowledge of the final key. When modeling the channel between the ambient transmitter and the backscatter devices using state-of-the-art 3GPP channel models we show that even in non-line-of-sight channels the distance from legitimate users to an eavesdropper being larger than a few wavelengths is not alone a sufficient security guarantee. This is in contrast with previous secret key generation methods where distance is assumed to prevent the eavesdropper from having any information about the key prior to error correction. Our simulations show that a distance based approach is too optimistic and there is a possibility that the eavesdropper still knows a substantial part of the final key. INDEX TERMSSecret key generation, physical layer security, ambient backscatter communication.

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Section: B Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%