Second world War Deception. Lessons Learned for Today's Joint Planner

Abstract

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the "best of the best" student research projects from the prior academic year. The ACSC research program encourages our students to move beyond the school's core curriculum in their own professional development and in "advancing aerospace power." The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations of airmen. Projects selected for publication combine solid research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operational questions. Some of these studies provide new solutions to familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By making these research studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination of the findings and to stimulate further research in these areas. AbstractSecond World War history offers the military strategist a cornucopia of lessons learned on how to apply the art of military deception. This paper analyzed six Allied deception operations to identify the fundamental reasons why Allied deception efforts were the most successful in history. The six deception operations reviewed were Barclay, Cockade, and Bodyguard as well as the Soviet deception operations at Stalingrad, Kursk, and White Russia. A critical analysis of these six operations identified seven major factors that made Allied deception efforts extremely effective. These seven factors were that the Allies controlled all key channels of information, had great intelligence "feedback" on their deception operations, had high-level and centralized control over deception planning, practiced sound deception techniques, subordinated deception to strategic and operational objectives, maintained adequate secrecy, and provided sufficient time for deception execution. These factors are relevant for today's operations and should be imbedded within US doctrine.This study then examined Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, and determined it could better incorporate the lessons learned from World War II. Current joint doctrine could be improved by underscoring the contribution that deception provides to surprise, the importance of integrating deception within all three levels of war, and the importance of exploiting an adversary's preexisting beliefs when creating a deception story. Applying these World War II lessons will bolster US deception capabilities.

STRATEJĠK SAVUNMA VE GÜVENLĠK PLANLAMASINDA ORTAK BĠR YAKLAġIM OLARAK SENARYO TEMELLĠ PLANLAMA

“…Senaryo uzayı yaklaşımı, karar vericilerin kolaylıkla ihmal edebileceği, olasılıklarda gizli aksaklık ve değişim ipuçlarını görmelerini sağlayarak aşağıdaki koşullarla yüzleşen örgütlerde stratejik planlama sürecinde daha başarılı sonuçlar elde edilmesini sağlayabilir (Bacon, 1998):…”