Secession crises, human welfare and conflict resolution

Abstract

national recognition of secessionist claims Violent and persistent inter-group conflict often results from antagonisms that arise could be made dependent on whether the between minority groups and central govrelevant minority group or central governernments over the oppressive treatment of ment lays out the most convincing plans for the minority group and over efforts by the enhancing the welfare of the population, minority group to secede from the parent avoiding exclusionary policies, and promoting inter-group cooperation and stability state. The legal principles that have guided rather than inter-group conflict and disinternational involvement in these secession order. The authors urge policy makers to crises, namely self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity of the state, have develop judgment criteria that reflect knowledge of these concerns to induce connot been effective or consistent inducements for resolution or prevention of the outbreak ditions more favourable for stability and peace. of conflict. This paper considers how inter-In recent times, dissemination of knowledge about the calamity and outright horror of civil wars has provoked the international community to renew the search for ways of ending them and preventing their initial occurrence. Academic discussion that explores the resolution of these conflicts has divided roughly into two schools. The 'rational' school has emphasized the provision of international security guarantees as necessary for persuading the warring parties to lay down their arms. 1 In contrast, the 'constructivist' school argues that international actors can influence the adoption of 'liberal norms' by leaders of previously warring parties and, thereby, develop in them an appreciation that their opposite numbers have cooperative and civil, rather than exploitive and violent intentions. 2 In this latter scenario, civil wars many be brought to peaceful resolution through persuasion of international actors and without resort to the more extensive and coercive involvement implied by international security guarantees.The authors share the view of the rational school that incentives matter and argue that the principles currently embodied in international law actually induce the actors in secession crises to engage in violent conflict to further their goals rather than to seek peaceful resolution of their differences-a point that emphasizes the importance of altering international law so that it provides incentives for the adoption of peaceful behaviours and, also for the adoption of liberal norms that can foster long-term cooperation and stability.The focus in this article is on preventing civil wars and, in particular, on forestalling the escalation of secession crises into violent war. Avoiding the costs of war through prevention is obviously desirable. Moreover, long-term cooperation and stability are more likely to be achieved when cross-group trust can be established (part of the liberal norm package) and doing so is more easily accomplished when violent inter-gr...