Principal–Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story

Abstract

Principal-agent (PA) has come a long way since it was introduced to the political science sphere. Nowadays, PA has established itself as an institutional midrange theoretical framework that encompasses various methodological as well as theoretical approaches. This article argues, however, that scholars still assume, a priori, that the agent is an opportunistic and disloyal actor. This article seeks to question this theoretical assumption by demonstrating how principals could be as much problematic as their agents, a phenomenon that it terms "pathological delegation." In so doing, it offers a first analysis of the small strand of the literature that examines problems embedded in the principals' side as well as provides new empirical evidence in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Finally, the article posits that scholars should not treat pathological delegation as an anomaly but rather attempt to integrate, test, and develop new theoretical assumptions on this phenomenon.

Introduction. Use and Limitations of the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union

“…These rules, together with power asymmetries within the collective principal, give (individual) actors credible instruments of (individual) control even if they need to act as a collective (Adriaensen 2016;Dijkstra this volume). This leads to what Sobol (2016) calls "pathological delegation": individual actions of control by separate actors within a collective principal undermine the collective delegation effort as well as the agent's work.…”

Non-exclusive delegation to the European External Action Service

“…The answer is that while many principal-agent scholars focus traditionally on the collectivity of member states, they should pay more attention to the individual member states and their behaviour (Gutner 2005;Thompson 2007;Sobol 2016). Individual member states make trade-offs in Treaty negotiations, face incomplete contracting and uncertainty and engage in bureaucratic politics.…”

Designing a Collective Agent for Trilogues in the European Parliament

“…Collective principals divided into subgroups with heterogeneous preferences often imply the risk of so-called pathological delegation (Sobol 2016). Some subgroups can benefit from agency shirking if the agent's preferences are more aligned with the subgroup than with other subgroups.…”