Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame

Abstract

Within the broader debate on the Greek crisis, the theory of 'populist democracy' postulates that populism is fundamental to the sustenance of the Greek political system and is at the heart of Greece's endemic domestic weaknesses. This article tests this assumption empirically through the use of a sophisticated framing analysis of speeches delivered by the leaders of the five parties in the Greek parliament in the period 2009-11. The findings confirm that populism: (a) is expressed through the narratives of political actors; (b) is observed across the party system; (c) is expressed in the forms of blame-shifting and exclusivity; and (d) differs depending on position in the party system. The article contributes to the debate by testing and building on the theory of democratic populism, providing a novel way of measuring and operationalizing populism and identifying a new typology that distinguishes between mainstream and fringe populism.* We thank Claudio Radaelli, the LSE Hellenic Observatory and the three anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Common Market Studies. Any remaining errors or omissions are our own.

Breaching the Social Contract: Crises of Democratic Representation and Patterns of Extreme Right Party Support

“…Other far right parties have enjoyed electoral success in Greece, for example the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) and Independent Greeks (ANEL). However, these fall within the radical right category (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015) and their support is more consistent with the predictions of existing theories. By contrast, the Golden Dawn falls into the extreme right category.…”

“…The result was the emergence of a new cleavage in Greece, expressed through strong support for anti-systemic and anti-memorandum parties (Dinas and Rori 2013;Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2013). In other words, the crisis of political representation opened up a space for parties beyond the confines of the system -parties that offered an alternative vision of representation and more broadly an alternative solution to the crisis -such as the Golden Dawn.…”

“…This is significant in light of the dynamics of the Greek political system, which is traditionally based on patronage and clientelism (Mitsopoulos and Pelagides 2011;Pappas 2003). In this case, Greece constitutes the paradox vis-à-vis Portugal and Spain given its ability to sustain a democratic institutional system during the post-dictatorship era 'while not progressing beyond the entrenched and deeply embedded clientelistic and rent-seeking networks that permeate Greek political culture' (Vasilopoulou et al 2014). The crisis challenged this clientelistic system at its core, discrediting the main actors and resulting in low levels of trust in democratic institutions.…”

“…The party's ideology emphasizes the principles of National Socialism. It opposes democracy on a number of grounds, for example that it cannot be applied in practice, that it was not actually approved by the Ancient Greeks and that it gives power to any layman, who may not endorse nationalist ideals (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). The party's organizational structures also resemble those of the Nazi system, stressing violence, discipline and ultimate respect for the leader.…”

The party politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: The case of Greece

“…the pure people versus the corrupt elite, is less helpful in the case of Greece. This is because research has shown that Greece is a populist democracy, with populism observed across the party system rather than by specific actors (Pappas, 2013;Vasilopoulou et al, 2014). 1 Drawing upon theories of party competition and Euroscepticism (De Vries and Hobolt, 2012;Helbling et al, 2010;Sitter, 2001;Taggart, 1998;van de Wardt et al, 2014;Vasilopoulou, 2018;Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015), the article hypothesizes that in times of crisis (1) mainstream parties will maintain their positive EU position, but are likely to increase EU issue salience; (2) challenger parties will emphasize their extreme positions on the EU, but the prospect of government participation is likely to result in them softening their Eurosceptic agenda; and (3) frames related to the specific nature of the crisis are likely to predominate across the party system.…”