<scp>Chain‐Store Pricing Across Local Markets</scp>

Dobson, Paul; Waterson, Michael

doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2005.00035.x

Cited by 63 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(20 reference statements)

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“…The local dominance of one retailer can mean that it may offer suppliers the only realistic opportunity to access customers within the catchment. There are also concerns for consumers when there are low levels of local inter-fascia competition given the potential for price discrimination (Dobson and Waterson, 2005).…”

Section: The Role Of Uk Retail Land-use Planning Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulation in practice: Power, resources and context at the local scale in UK food retailing

Wood

Alexander

2016

Environ Plan A

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This article uses a relational lens to explore the conflict between the regulatory state and a leading food retailer seeking store expansion within one catchment in south-east England over an eight year period. The research highlights the relational power geometries which play out in context between regulators and a regulated corporate firm to emphasise the role of power, resources, and scale. The research teases out how the power of the state to uphold an interpretation of market rules is compromised by a lack of responsiveness compared to both the proactive and reactive tactics of the well-resourced corporate retailer. It recognises how multiple regulatory agents of the state with divergent goals, sometimes situated across different spatial scales of governance, can produce markedly different judgements resulting in outcomes that are not in the public interest. Such situations require swift and coherent regulatory responses and can reveal the need for changes to the organisation of the regulatory infrastructure itself.

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Section: The Role Of Uk Retail Land-use Planning Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulation in practice: Power, resources and context at the local scale in UK food retailing

Wood

Alexander

2016

Environ Plan A

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“…Under certain conditions, the outcome could be beneficial in terms of aggregated profits over the national market. Dobson and Waterson (2005) stress that their result is not limited to the specific market structure of monopolies in some markets and duopolies in others. The result also holds when one considers more than two firms competing in the most contested markets.…”

Section: The Dobson-waterson Model Does Not Apply To French Funeral Smentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although the Dobson-Waterson model of uniform pricing in a set of local oligopolistic markets is an attractive option for explaining our puzzling observations, Dobson and Waterson (2005) contemplate a situation characterized by oligopolies competing in a series of local markets. They assume that the intensity of competition is different in each market, even though a monopoly or a small oligopoly is operating in each of them.…”

Section: The Dobson-waterson Model Does Not Apply To French Funeral Smentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But for obvious reasons, we can discard this kind of assumption. There remain three potential explanations: 1) the local markets, despite the differences emphasized by the antitrust authorities, are all imperfectly competitive; and indeed in this kind of situation, there is at least one good theory of uniform pricing by a chain operating in various oligopolistic markets (Dobson and Waterson, 2005); 2) some markets could be a potential source of monopoly profits, however their number and/or their dimensions may be too small to justify the administrative costs of price discrimination policy; 3) the competitive conditions in the various markets are not as different as antitrust authorities suggest and the markets are all competitive enough.…”

Section: Leader's Pricing Strategies and Market Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

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How consumer information curtails market power in the funeral industry

2012

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The purpose of this article is to show, based on the case of the French market, that consumer perception of different funeral service offers, along with new entry in a special storing facility service ("chambre funéraire"), can be sufficient to impose competitive pressures on the various suppliers, including the former monopolist. With a discrete choice experiment implemented in Lyon, France, we find evidence that, contrary to widely shared beliefs about this specific market, demand for funeral services seems characterized by relatively high price elasticities, at least as soon as consumers are fully informed about the opportunities open to them in this market. Consumer behavior has actually changed in favor of a better assessment of the different possibilities of services supplied and of their relative price. We then implement simulations in local markets and show that, with good consumer information, the market power of the supposedly dominant firm is much less important than it is generally believed. Furthermore, simulations stress the procompetitive effects of setting up a new storing facility by any businesses. We finally show that, if some improvements can still be brought to the functioning of this market, they should come from a better regulation of consumer information and of the entry of firms.

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“…See also Liu and Serfes (2010). 8 Other related papers that consider the effects of price discrimination when competition varies across markets are Aguirre (2000), Dobson and Waterson (2005), Aguirre (2011) and Jorge and Pires (2013).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Economics of the “Meeting Competition Defense” Under the Robinson–Patman Act

Aguirre

2016

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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In this paper we analyze the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination when competitive pressure varies across markets. In particular, we study the economic aspects of the Robinson-Patman Act associated with the "meeting competition defense." Using equilibrium models, the main result we find is that this defense might be used successfully in cases of primary line injury precisely when it should not be used, namely when price discrimination reduces social welfare. This result obtains both when discrimination appears in the final good market and when it is used in the intermediate goods market. We also find that these results may also remain under secondary line injury. (JEL D42, L12, L13)

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Chain‐Store Pricing Across Local Markets

Cited by 63 publications

References 17 publications

Regulation in practice: Power, resources and context at the local scale in UK food retailing

Regulation in practice: Power, resources and context at the local scale in UK food retailing

How consumer information curtails market power in the funeral industry

On the Economics of the “Meeting Competition Defense” Under the Robinson–Patman Act

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