<scp>A Noncooperative Quantity‐Rationing Theory of Transboundary Pollution</scp>

Shah, Sudhir A.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01460.x

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Focusing on the interaction between technology and contributions to climate protection, Buchholz and Konrad (, ) and Buchholz et al. () show that the public good nature of environmental protection might induce countries to be “less green” in order to strengthen their bargaining position in the environmental policy coordination game; see also the results of Shah () in the context of negotiations of emission caps. This argument has been further generalized by Beccherle and Tirole () and still holds true when introducing uncertainty or dynamics (Harstad, , ; Konrad and Thum, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology Transfers for Climate Change

Elsayyad

Morath

2016

Int Economic Review

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This article considers the transfer of cost‐reducing technology in the context of contributions to climate protection. We analyze a two‐period public goods model where later contributions can be based on better information, but delaying the mitigation effort is costly because of irreversible damages. Investments in technology affect the countries' timing of contributing. We show that countries have an incentive to provide cost‐reducing technology as this can lead to an earlier contribution of other countries and can therefore reduce a country's burden of contributing to the public good. Our results provide a rationale for the support of technology sharing initiatives.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology Transfers for Climate Change

Elsayyad

Morath

2016

Int Economic Review

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“…The reason is that private information requires revelation mechanisms at the price of distortions from the first best up to the point where trade breaks down (Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983). The theory of mechanism design and with it the implicit assumption of complete contracts is used in many environmental applications with a focus on regulatory issues; see, for example, Spulber (1988), Xepapadeas (1991), Mansouri and Youssef (2000), Bontems and Bourgeon (2005, 2007), and Shah (2010). Lewis (1996) emphasizes that asymmetric information can turn common policy prescriptions upside down.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments Within an Incomplete Contract Framework

Wirl

2013

J Public Economic Theory

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This paper compares three different legal means—no environmental policy (the pollutee pays), full liability (the polluter pays), and pollution standards—to reduce and regulate neighborhood externalities within an incomplete contract framework. It turns out that the relative efficiency of these instruments depends, in general, on details. However, moderate standards are preferable to no environmental policy and tight (but not too tight) standards dominate liability. This provides under the given assumptions (neighborhood externalities, incomplete contracts) a justification for “sensible” standards for three reasons. First, unilateral allocations of property rights are biased that distort allocations even if ex post bargaining takes place. Second, a standard is superior in the following sense: if it is set equal to the outcome under any allocation of rights, it will be improved in the process of ex post bargaining. Third, unilateral property rights encourage strategic ex ante investments up to the point that committing to no bargaining would be beneficial (if possible).

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“…See also the results ofShah (2010) in the context of negotiations of emission caps 15. See Harstad (2010) and Konrad and Thum (forthcoming) 16.…”

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confidence: 99%