Scientists Are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination

Abstract

Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that present different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally epistemic consequentialists about imagination.

Qualitative methods in philosophy of science: Historical and contemporary applications.

“…This argument takes inspiration from philosophy of science and cognitive science perspectives stressing that the inherent complexity of science requires multiple disciplinary lenses and methodological tools (Nersessian, 1992(Nersessian, , 2008(Nersessian, , 2022 and that questions concerning how science is done by human agents require the perspectives and tools only qualitative inquiry can bring. Interestingly, though not surprisingly, similar methodological tensions occur in relation to the study of science within philosophical and cognitive science communities, notably in relation to the role of qualitative methods and the epistemic assumptions and constraints that accompany their use (Hangel & ChoGlueck, 2023;Nersessian & MacLeod, 2022;Stuart, 2023;Wagenknecht et al, 2015). In any academic context, these discussions are never simply about methods; they carry implicit assumptions about the nature of science, especially the degree to which it is inflected by human processes: cognitive, social, political, emotional, and more, and the implications of this inflection.…”

“…Over the past two decades, the use of qualitative methods to investigate science has expanded, especially within the cognitive science and philosophy of science communities who reject the premise that such study should “black box” cognition as dictated by Latour and Woolgar (1979/1986). Seeking to understand how science advances, that is, how science, in general, is accomplished, philosophers of science increasingly have used a variety of empirical methods including qualitative: cognitive-historical case-based analysis (e.g., Gorman & Carlson, 1990; Nersessian, 1984, 2008; Thagard, 1992; Tweney, 1985), participant observation and ethnography (e.g., Bursten, 2015; Dunbar, 1995; Nersessian, 2008, 2022), and interview analysis (e.g., Andersen & Wagenknecht, 2013; Buddle et al, 2021; Leonelli, 2016; Rinkus & O’Rourke, 2020; Stuart, 2023), among them. The interpretive stance taken in relation to the use of these methods implicates all scientific activities as an amalgamation of social/historical/cultural and cognitive processes.…”

The consequences of seeing imagination as a dual‐process virtue

“…Drawing on the framework of dual‐process virtue epistemology, Stuart (2021) contends that the ability to imagine (imagination 0 ) can be manifested in either of two cognitive processes: imagination 1 and imagination 2 . In addition to categorizing these styles of imagining as Type 1 or Type 2 processing, Stuart (2022) connects them with the two main forms of intellectual virtues. Thus, while the link between imagination and the dual‐process model have been noticed elsewhere (Walton 1990; Gendler 2007; Williamson 2016; Arcangeli 2017), Stuart expands on this idea by situating it within virtue epistemology.…”

“…Stuart states in the context of dual‐process virtue epistemology that imagination 1 is linked to Type 1 processing and reliabilist virtues (Stuart 2022, 527–28). Nevertheless, in this case it is important to recognize that this type of imagining, even if it is supported by the same processing type as, say, Type 1 perception, has a distinct relationship to the world.…”

“…In terms of intellectual virtues, Stuart links imagination 2 with responsibilist virtues (Stuart 2022, 527–28). At the same time, he recognizes that such imagination is subject to the so‐called problem of arbitrariness (McAllister 2013, 13–14; Stuart 2021, 1340–41).…”