Scientific revolutions, specialization and the discovery of the structure of DNA: toward a new picture of the development of the sciences

Abstract

In his late years, Thomas Kuhn became interested in the process of scientific specialization, which does not seem to possess the destructive element that is characteristic of scientific revolutions. It therefore makes sense to investigate whether and how Kuhn's insights about specialization are consistent with, and actually fit, his model of scientific progress through revolutions. In this paper, I argue that the transition toward a new specialty corresponds to a revolutionary change for the group of scientists involved in such a transition. I will clarify the role of the scientific community in revolutionary changes and characterize the incommensurability across specialties as possessing both semantic and methodological aspects. The discussion of the discovery of the structure of DNA will serve both as an illustration of my main argument and as reply to one criticism raised against Kuhn-namely, that his model cannot capture cases of revolutionary yet non-disruptive episodes of scientific progress. Revisiting Kuhn's ideas on specialization will shed new light on some often overlooked features of scientific change.

Interpreting the History of Evolutionary Biology through a Kuhnian Prism: Sense or Nonsense?

“…This implication of our analysis, in turn, is perfectly in line with yet another strand in the Kuhn literature, namely the criticism that his developmental scheme does not "capture some crucial episodes in the history of science (…)" (Politi 2018(Politi , p. 2284. 16 Bird refers in this respect to the discovery of the structure of DNA.…”

“…We agree with Politi that the discovery of the structure of DNA was, contra Bird, not revolutionary in its consequence for molecular genetics "simply because, before such a discovery, there was not such a thing as 'molecular genetics'" (Politi 2018(Politi , p. 2284. Rather, Watson's and Crick's discovery was revolutionary "precisely in virtue of its role in the creation and establishment of molecular biology (…)" (Politi 2018(Politi , p. 2284.…”

“…We agree with Politi that the discovery of the structure of DNA was, contra Bird, not revolutionary in its consequence for molecular genetics "simply because, before such a discovery, there was not such a thing as 'molecular genetics'" (Politi 2018(Politi , p. 2284. Rather, Watson's and Crick's discovery was revolutionary "precisely in virtue of its role in the creation and establishment of molecular biology (…)" (Politi 2018(Politi , p. 2284. Likewise, the discovery of the deep history of Earth (Rudwick 2005), subatomic particles, the true nature of viruses (Méthot 2016) and evolution was revolutionary in virtue of the role it played in the establishment of geology, quantum mechanics, virology and evolutionary biology, respectively.…”

The emergence of objectivity: Fleck, Foucault, Kuhn and Hacking

“…Contrary to Fleck, however, he problematised the very concept of 'scientific community': as he noticed in the Postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, scientific communities may exist at different levels -for example, there is the general scientific community of physicists and then, at lower levels, the specialties and sub-specialties communities. This means that changes affecting a community at the lower level may not affect the community at large (see Politi, 2018). Nevertheless, as Möβner ( 2011) noted, the influence of social factors is more widespread in Fleck: whereas the latter applies the framework of thought style even to non-scientific areas, Kuhn is reluctant to extend that of paradigm out of the hard sciences, not to mention to ordinary life.…”

Las Filosofías De La Ciencia De Thomas Kuhn: Del Ciclo Revolucionario Al Árbol Evolutivo

“…¿Cuál es la relevancia de la filosofía evolutiva de la ciencia de Kuhn para la filosofía de la ciencia contemporánea? Como opina un comentador: «La mayoría de los filósofos que han elogiado o desafiado la opinión de Kuhn se han centrado casi exclusivamente en la ERC [La estructura de las revoluciones científicas] ... [y] no han prestado suficiente atención a las obras posteriores a la ERC de Kuhn, casi como si no hubiese tenido nada relevante que decir o simplemente nada que decir después de ERC" (Politi 2018(Politi , pp. 2267(Politi -2268.…”