2010
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00261.x
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Scientific Representation

Abstract: Abstract:Scientific representation is currently a booming topic, both in analytical philosophy and in history and philosophy of science. The analytical inquiry attempts to come to terms with the relation between theory and world; while historians and philosophers of science aim to develop an account of the practice of model building in the sciences. This article provides a review of recent work within both traditions, and ultimately argues for a practice-based account of the means employed by scientists to eff… Show more

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Cited by 101 publications
(26 citation statements)
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“…Actually, in a later paper (Suárez, 2010), he rejects the view that the direction of representation is essentially intentional. Suárez opposes the intentional view to what he calls the indented use view.…”
Section: Scientific Representation and Science Learning 219mentioning
confidence: 91%
“…Actually, in a later paper (Suárez, 2010), he rejects the view that the direction of representation is essentially intentional. Suárez opposes the intentional view to what he calls the indented use view.…”
Section: Scientific Representation and Science Learning 219mentioning
confidence: 91%
“…5-7). 9 For more on these and other accounts see, e.g., Suárez 2010;Downes 2011;Frigg and Hartmann 2012. content question How do the falsehoods (or the models that involve them) figure into the content of understanding the phenomenon?…”
Section: Phenomena Falsehoods Understanding: Two Separate Questionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Perhaps most astonishingly, if OC is correct, the fact that most philosophers of science have endorsed the thought that explanation is an epistemic category or activity implies that most philosophers of science have unwittingly misconceived of the nature of explanation. If EC is correct, the problems of scientific explanation just become special problems of scientific representation, in so far as there are any (see Suárez 2010).…”
Section: Two Conceptions Of Explanationmentioning
confidence: 99%