Scientific Discovery by Computer as Empirical Refutation of the Strong Programme

Abstract

In his manifesto for the `strong programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), David Bloor expressed its diametric opposition to the `mentalist' or `teleological' model of `rationalist' philosophers, saying that `there can be no doubt that if the teleological model is true then the strong programme is false'. The `teleological' point of view can be seen embodied in the mentalism of contemporary interdisciplinary research under the heading of `cognitive science', and particularly in computer models of artificial intelligence (AI). In this sense, the enterprise of cognitive science, encompassing psychology, linguistics, philosophy, neuroscience and AI constitutes a massive empirical challenge to SSK's claims for the social causation of belief. Of particular interest is the AI work on scientific discovery as a special case of heuristic problem solving: the possibility of computers autonomously making fundamental scientific discoveries is providing dramatic confirmation of the `teleological' view that there are principles of rationality and a `scientific method' which are independent of social factors.

Introduction: Why There Should Be a Cognitive Anthropology of Science

“…Laudan, 1977, some protagonists of the Science War). From this, some have concluded that only cognitive studies can reveal the real nature of Science, that scientific discovery by computer was a refutation of the strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge (Slezak, 1989), and some have emphasised that "cognitive theories do not agree with the relativist epistemology advocated within the sociology of knowledge" (Freedman, 1997; see also the dismissive attitude of Carruthers et al, 2003).…”

Emergence and development of the National Innovation Systems concept

“…Beyond work in the S&TS field, and to some extent in the history of technology, relatively little attention has been paid to the historical process through which knowledge and artifacts become good facts or successful technologies; such an understanding of knowledge production is often dismissed by scholars external to the sociology of science and technology as inconsequential or unimportant (see, for example, Matthews 1998;Slezak 1989Slezak , 1994. Once a piece of scientific knowledge or tangible artifact becomes black-boxed, it acquires an air of inexorability, as if it were the only possible solution to the set of problems to which it is applied (Sismondo 2004).…”

Die Provokation der „Artificial Societies“

“…Das wurde vor allem in der Kontroverse um die soge nannten "discovery programs" der KI und um den Erklärungsanspruch der sozialkonstruktivistischen Wissenschaftssoziologie deutlich. In der "SlezakDebatte" (Slezak 1989 …”