Science, assertion, and the common ground

Abstract

I argue that the appropriateness of an assertion is sensitive to context—or, really, the “common ground”—in a way that hasn’t previously been emphasized by philosophers. This kind of context-sensitivity explains why some scientific conclusions seem to be appropriately asserted even though they are not known, believed, or justified on the available evidence. I then consider other recent attempts to account for this phenomenon and argue that if they are to be successful, they need to recognize the kind of context-sensitivity that I argue for.

The Next Generation Event Horizon Telescope Collaboration: History, Philosophy, and Culture

“…18 In the second instance, when we attribute consensus to a group, are we "summarising" the attitudes of the individuals, or does the collaborative aspect add something to this-possibly in the sense of a "plural subject" or a "group agent" [108][109][110]? Third, we can distinguish between at least two attitudes relevant to the consensus: if a group is in consensus does it (or each member of it) hold a consensual belief, or a consensual acceptance, where different epistemic norms are associated with each attitude (e.g., belief requires a commitment to truth while acceptance may not) [111][112][113][114]. 19 Fourth, we can ask about the extent of consensus: at one extreme consensus might be identified with unanimity, but some level of dissent may be consistent with consensus, and indeed, as we discuss below, even encouraged [116].…”