Schooling, Search, and Spouse Selection: Testing Economic Theories of Marriage and Household Behavior

Boulier, Bryan L.; Rosenzweig, Mark R.

doi:10.1086/261253

Cited by 119 publications

(76 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The first is to assume a linear relationship between the count data and the covariates and to apply ordinary least squares (OLS, e. g. Willis 1974, Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984, Boulier and Mankiw 1986, Peters 1986, Behrman and Taubman 1989, Schultz 1990. Most of this literature studies fertility measured by number of children.)…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Count data models for demographic data∗

Winkelmann

Zimmermann

1994

Mathematical Population Studies

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Key demographic variables, such as the number of children and the number of marriages or divorces, can only take integer values. This papers deals with the estimation of single equation models in which the counts are regressed on a set of observed individual characteristics such as age, gender, or nationality. Most empirical work in population economics has neglected the fact that the dependent variable is a nonnegative integer. In the few cases where this feature was recognized, the authors advocated the use of the Poisson regression model. The Poisson model imposes, however, the equality of conditional mean and variance, a restriction which is often rejected by the data. We propose a generalized event count model to simultaneously allow for a wide class of count data models and account for over-and underdispersion. This model is successfully applied to German data on fertility, divorces and mobility. Abstract Key demographic variables, such as the number of children and the number of marriages or divorces, can only take integer values. This papers deals with the estimation of single equation models in which the counts are regressed on a set of observed individual characteristics such as age, gender, or nationality. Most empirical work in population economics has neglected the fact that the dependent variable is a nonnegative integer. In the few cases where this feature was recognized, the authors advocated the use of the Poisson regression model. The Poisson model imposes, however, the equality of conditional mean and variance, a restriction which is often rejected by the data. We propose a generalized event count model to simultaneously allow for a wide class of count data models and account for over-and underdispersion. This model is successfully applied to German data on fertility, divorces and mobility.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Count data models for demographic data∗

Winkelmann

Zimmermann

1994

Mathematical Population Studies

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“…Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) used an instrumental variables estimation strategy to confirm the existence of payoffs to spousal search and positive assortative mating with respect to schooling in the Philippines. They also found that more educated women married later which they explained by noting that even though additional schooling attracted better quality spouses, it reduced the gains from marriage.…”

Section: Assortative Matingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Marriage Markets in Developing Countries

Anukriti

Dasgupta

2017

The Oxford Handbook of Women and the Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Marriage Markets in Developing Countries FebruAry 2017Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5-9 53113 Bonn, GermanyPhone: +49-228-3894-0 Email: publications@iza.org www.iza.org IZA -Institute of Labor EconomicsDiscussion PaPer series IZA DP No. 10556 Marriage Markets in Developing CountriesFebruAry 2017 S AnukritiBoston College and IZA Shatanjaya DasguptaBeloit College Marriage Markets in Developing Countries 1This chapter reviews the literature on marriage in developing countries. We describe how marital matching occurs; the trends in age at marriage; assortative mating patterns; marriage payments; and spousal decision-making after a marriage has occurred. Lastly, we discuss trends and rationales for consanguineous and polygamous marriages -practices that are largely unique to the developing world. JEL Classification:J1, J12

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“…For example, Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) show that physical attractiveness affects marital allocations, and it is plausible that it might also affect the size of the dowry transfer. Alternatively, women with very likable personalities may receive higher dowries from their parents and have better marital allocations than women with disagreeable personalities.…”

Section: Empirical Specification and Identificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) have shown that physical attractiveness affects allocations within marriage, and it is plausible that it might similarly impact the size of marital transfers. Similarly, a bride with a pleasant personality may receive a higher transfer from her parents and may also be treated well within her marriage.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Dowry and Intrahousehold Bargaining

Brown¹

2009

J. Human Resources

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Schooling, Search, and Spouse Selection: Testing Economic Theories of Marriage and Household Behavior

Cited by 119 publications

References 8 publications

Count data models for demographic data∗

Count data models for demographic data∗

Marriage Markets in Developing Countries

Dowry and Intrahousehold Bargaining

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