School Choice Under Imperfect Information

Ajayi, Kehinde; Sidibé, Modibo

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3524535

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…Finally, our baseline model assumes that all households have the same preferences for school quality. This assumption is supported by some empirical work (Greaves and Hussain 2023) but contradicted by others (Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2009;Borghans, H. H. Golsteyn, and Zölitz 2015;Burgess et al 2015;Abdulkadiroglu, Agarwal, and Pathak 2017;Glazerman and Dotter 2017;Harris and Larsen 2019;Ruijs and Oosterbeek 2019;Ajayi and 36. More generally, peer group preferences have been shown theoretically to weaken schools' incentives to exert effort under school choice (Barseghyan, Clark, and Coate 2019).…”

Section: Discussion Of Potential Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 87%

School Choice and Neighborhood Sorting: Equilibrium Consequences of Geographic School Admissions

Greaves,

Turon

2024

SSRN Journal

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Section: Discussion Of Potential Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 87%

School Choice and Neighborhood Sorting: Equilibrium Consequences of Geographic School Admissions

Greaves,

Turon

2024

SSRN Journal

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“…However, given that SeqSD provides accurate information on the students' budget set, cutoffs can be less effective than SeqSD in reducing wasteful information acquisition if the distributions of preferences and exam scores fluctuate between years. For instance, Ajayi and Sidibe (2020) show that the correlation between the school cutoffs in 2007 and 2008 in Ghana was 0.84 for all schools, and as low as 0.37 for less selective schools. Information on the cutoffs is widely used in practice (see Immorlica, Leshno, Lo, and Lucier (2020) for an overview of college admission systems where the cutoffs are published).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets

Hakimov,

Kübler,

Pan

2023

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When applying to a university, students and their parents devote considerable time acquiring information about university programs in order to form preferences. We explore ways to reduce wasteful information acquisition, that is, to help students avoid acquiring information about out‐of‐reach schools or universities, using a market design approach. Focusing on markets where students are ranked by universities based on exam scores, we find that, both theoretically and experimentally, a sequential serial dictatorship mechanism leads to higher student welfare than a direct serial dictatorship mechanism. This is because the sequential mechanism informs students about which universities are willing to admit them, thereby directing their search. Our experiments also show that the sequential mechanism has behavioral advantages because subjects deviate from the optimal search strategy less frequently than under the direct mechanism. Furthermore, providing historical cutoff scores under the direct mechanism can increase student welfare, especially when the information costs are high, although the observed effect is weaker than that of a sequential mechanism.

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“…Our study contributes to the literature on information provision policies in educational markets (Allende et al, 2019;Hastings and Weinstein, 2008;Andrabi et al, 2017) by integrating information within the centralized school choice process, and testing new channels that can potentially help to distribute the information at scale. We also build on an emerging strand of empirical market design work focused on educational markets 3 (Arteaga et al, 2022;Kapor et al, 2020;Ajayi and Sidibe, 2020) by assessing how new information can affect search in a context with incomplete information about all the options.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Information on School Attributes and Placement Probabilities Direct Search and Choice? Evidence from Choice Platforms in Ecuador and Peru

Arteaga¹,

Elacqua²,

Krussig³

et al. 2022

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This paper evaluates how new information influences families applica- tions and assignment outcomes in elementary school choice settings. Specifi- cally, using a multi-country RCT based in Tacna, Peru and Manta, Ecuador, we examine the effect of providing personalized information on schooling alternatives and placement risk. We find that applicants who received feed- back on placement risk and a suggestion of new schools add more schools to their applications and were more likely to include recommended schools than other alternatives available. Interestingly, the project implemented in Manta, Ecuador had only marginal effects for all outcomes. The main differ- ence across implementations was the inclusion of outreach and information provision through an additional WhatsApp “warning” in Peru, which was not realized in Ecuador. A lower school density seems to have also been a contributing factor to the results observed in the Ecuadorian context.

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School Choice Under Imperfect Information

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

School Choice and Neighborhood Sorting: Equilibrium Consequences of Geographic School Admissions

School Choice and Neighborhood Sorting: Equilibrium Consequences of Geographic School Admissions

Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets

Can Information on School Attributes and Placement Probabilities Direct Search and Choice? Evidence from Choice Platforms in Ecuador and Peru

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