Schiller on Freedom and Aesthetic Value: Part I

Matherne, Samantha; Riggle, Nick

doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayaa006

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…More helpful here are some of the senses of ‘autonomy’ surveyed by Darwall in Darwall 2006. Even more helpful, though, is the account of autonomy recently offered as a reading of Schiller by Samantha Matherne and Nick Riggle (in Matherne and Riggle 2020). Matherne and Riggle read Schiller as holding that as human beings we face a conflict between our rational nature and our sensuous nature.…”

Section: The Value Of Playmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why So Serious? The Nature and Value of Play*

Ridge

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In this paper, I develop an account of play and playfulness, argue it is superior to its rivals and investigate the value of play so understood. I begin by laying out some interesting semantic features of ‘play’ which have not previously been systematically investigated (section 1). A failure to note these distinctions can lead theorists (and has led them) into unwitting equivocations and confusions. Drawing on this broader semantic framework, I lay out and motivate a positive account of the meaning of ‘play’ and the nature of play full‐stop (section 2). I then survey some of this account’s main advantages (section 3) and argue that the theory helps us better understand the value of play (section 4), where this value should inform both moral theory and political philosophy. I then compare the proposal with rival theories (section 5). I conclude by suggesting directions for further research.

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Section: The Value Of Playmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why So Serious? The Nature and Value of Play*

Ridge

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…This is a vast oversimplification of a very complex theory. For a detailed discussion of Schiller's theory of the play drive, how it unites the rational and the sensual, and how it provides an account of aesthetic value, see Samantha Matherne and Nick Riggle's reading of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (Matherne and Riggle 2020). This suggestion leads to a rather vast literature on what's called "the magic circle" -the alternate space of play.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fake News, Conspiracy Theorizing, and Intellectual Vice

Meyer¹,

Alfano²

2022

Social Virtue Epistemology

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This collection of 19 chapters, all appearing in print here for the first time and written by an international team of established and emerging scholars, explores the place of intellectual virtues and vices in a social world. Relevant virtues include open-mindedness, curiosity, intellectual courage, diligence in inquiry, and the like. Relevant vices include dogmatism, need for immediate certainty, and gullibility and the like.The chapters are divided into four key sections: Foundational Issues; Individual Virtues; Collective Virtues; and Methods and Measurements. And the chapters explore the most salient questions in these areas of research, including: How are individual intellectual virtues and vices affected by their social contexts? Does being in touch with other openminded people make us more open-minded? Conversely, does connection to other dogmatic people make us more dogmatic? Can groups possess virtues and vices distinct from those of their members? For instance, could a group of dogmatic individuals operate in an open-minded way despite the vices of its members?Each chapter receives commentary from two other authors in the volume, and each original author then replies to these commentaries. Together, the authors form part of a collective conversation about how we can know about what we know. In so doing, they not only theorize but enact social virtue epistemology.

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“…In this manner, and this is what makes his account so interesting, Schiller makes double use of sensibility in his account of moral virtue. The first is, as just presented, the conceptually constitutive or metaphysical role of aesthetically characterising the highest form of human self-determinability before action takes place as 'aesthetic condition', whereas the second use is his description of the moral agent as appearing free and thereby beautiful 22 For some recent interpretations of Schiller's various forms of freedom that I will discuss in more detail elsewhere, see Matherne & Riggle 2020, 2021and Schmalzried 2017 For definition of holy will in Kant see Kant (1785: IV, 439).…”

Section: Human Existence and Perfection As Both Rational And Sensualmentioning

confidence: 99%

Schiller on the Aesthetic Constitution of Moral Virtue and the Justification of Aesthetic Obligations

Plato

2021

Disputatio

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Friedrich Schiller’s notion of moral virtue includes self-determination through practical rationality as well as sensual self-determination through the pursuit of aesthetic value, i.e., through beauty. This paper surveys conceptual assumptions behind Schiller’s notions of moral and aesthetic perfections that allow him to ground both, moral virtue and beauty on conceptions of freedom. While Schiller’s notions of grace and dignity describe relations between the aesthetic and the moral aspects of certain determining actions, the ‘aesthetic condition’ conceptualises human beings from the perspective of aesthetic self-determinability. Schiller thereby provides a normative aesthetic standard that not only affects the moral nature of our motives and actions, but also of what we, as human beings, want to and should be conceived of in the first place. As I argue in this paper, considering this aesthetic self-determinability from a moral perspective results in an aesthetic constitution of moral virtue, which in turn justifies aesthetic obligations. Schiller thereby merges the perfections of the two normative domains for an extended anthropological conception of aesthetically infused notion of moral virtue while assuring the conceptual autonomy of each normative domain. Giving aesthetic demands a practical normative role by partly constituting moral virtue and thereby still maintain their aesthetic normative source is a move that opens up many resources for current research on the interactions between various normative demands, such as aesthetic reasons for moral or legal judgements and action, aesthetic obligations or weighing varying sources and elements of normative authority and hegemony against each other.

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Schiller on Freedom and Aesthetic Value: Part I

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Why So Serious? The Nature and Value of Play*

Why So Serious? The Nature and Value of Play*

Fake News, Conspiracy Theorizing, and Intellectual Vice

Schiller on the Aesthetic Constitution of Moral Virtue and the Justification of Aesthetic Obligations

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