Scepticisms and beyond? A comprehensive portrait of climate change communication by the far right in the European Parliament

Forchtner, Bernhard; Lubarda, Balša

doi:10.1080/09644016.2022.2048556

Cited by 26 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Although all EPGs were more sceptical about implementation ambitions than targets, this was particularly visible for Eurosceptic MEPs. This is in line with Forchtner and Lubarda's (2022) study, which showed that far-right MEPs criticised how anthropogenic climate change was addressed (process) rather than being sceptical about its existence.…”

Section: Ideological Territorial and Integration-based Debate Dynamicssupporting

confidence: 88%

“…While this offers more opportunities for smaller groups such as the Greens and the Liberals to act as kingmakers, it also makes it more difficult to find compromises that go beyond the status quo and push for ambitious climate policies (Buzogány & Ćetković, 2021;Petri & Biedenkopf, 2021;Vogeler et al, 2021). In addition, the increase in (right-wing) Eurosceptic and populist parties increased the number of critical voices towards EU climate ambitions, especially when new proposals concern the distribution of competences between the EU and its member states (Buzogány & Ćetković, 2021;Forchtner & Lubarda, 2022;Petri & Biedenkopf, 2021;Vogeler, 2022). Finally, enlargement gave a bigger voice to the less ambitious countriesthose concerned about the socio-economic repercussions of transition measures.…”

Section: A Trade-off Between Influence and Ambition?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, they allow us to capture more complex dynamics of agendasetting, argumentation, and justification. Some authors have recognised these advantages and used parliamentary debates to study the emotions and the quality of deliberations (Roald & Sangolt, 2012), the level and type of climate scepticism among far-right groups (Forchtner & Lubarda, 2022), as well as individual and meso-level dynamics in discursive networks (Vogeler, 2022;Vogeler et al, 2021;Wendler, 2019).…”

Section: Capturing the Growing Complexity Of Climate Policy Ambitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Framing Climate Policy Ambition in the European Parliament

Kinski

Servent

2022

PaG

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The European Union’s climate policy is considered quite ambitious. This has led to a growing interest among political scientists investigating the European Parliament’s ability to negotiate such ambitious climate legislation. These studies generally focus on the voting behaviour of members of the European Parliament, which allows us to know more about their positions when it comes to accepting or rejecting legislative acts. However, we know surprisingly little about how they debate and justify their positions in Parliament. In these debates, members of the European Parliament not only identify the problem (i.e., climate change and its adverse effects) but also discuss potential solutions (i.e., their willingness or ambition to fight and adapt to climate change). In addition, plenary debates are ideal for making representative claims based on citizens’ interests on climate action. Therefore, this article aims to understand how climate policy ambitions are debated in the European Parliament and whose interests are represented. We propose a new manual coding scheme for climate policy ambitions in parliamentary debate and employ it in climate policy debates in the ninth European Parliament (2019–present). In doing so, this article makes a methodological contribution to operationalising climate policy ambition from a parliamentary representation and legitimation perspective. We find debating patterns that connect quite detailed ambitions with clear representative claims and justifications. There is more agreement on what to do than how to get there, with divides emerging based on party, ideological, and member-state characteristics.

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Section: Ideological Territorial and Integration-based Debate Dynamicssupporting

confidence: 88%

Section: A Trade-off Between Influence and Ambition?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Capturing the Growing Complexity Of Climate Policy Ambitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Framing Climate Policy Ambition in the European Parliament

Kinski

Servent

2022

PaG

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“…Albert, 2022, p. 1). Future research should investigate the links between climate securitization and the demands for declarations of climate emergencies meant to invoke a “state of exception.” While such demands are intended to bring about “the mass mobilization of a jurisdiction's full economic, social and technical capacities to ward off an existential threat,” in practice, states of exceptions could aid reactionary forces and undermine constitutional rights (Hulme, 2019; Forchtner and Lubarda 2022).…”

Section: Conclusion: Researching Political and Policy Implications Of...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate nationalisms: Beyond the binaries of good and bad nationalism

Kashwan

Liu

Das

2022

WIREs Climate Change

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Climate nationalism has attracted renewed interest among scholars and analysts of international climate politics, security studies, and international relations more broadly. However, the most prominent arguments about climate nationalism follow a storyline of “good nationalism” or “bad nationalism”—a “positive civic nationalism” versus a “destructive ethnic nationalism.” In this article, we review these debates by drawing on prominent strands of scholarship on climate nationalism, mapped onto three key aspects: climate securitization, political populism, and Civic nationalism. To further ground our review in real‐world politics outside of the United States and Western Europe, we offer a snapshot of climate nationalism narratives deployed by political elites in three large countries in the Asia‐Pacific: Australia, India, and China. Our review shows that considering the multiscalar, multisectoral, and global scope of climate action, it may be futile to look for a conclusive answer to the question of whether nationalism is good or bad for fostering effective and enduring transformations suitable for a climate‐changed world. Instead, we recommend a research agenda focused on investigating the myriad ways in which political and economic elites fuse discourses of nationalism with various aspects of climate politics and climate action. A proper understanding of elite interests, discourses, and strategies, in ways that account for varied national and regional political and economic contexts, we argue is crucial for a fuller understanding of how narratives of nationalism may affect climate action. This article is categorized under: The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Policies, Instruments, Lifestyles, Behavior Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance Climate and Development > Knowledge and Action in Development Policy and Governance > National Climate Change Policy

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“…Mudde 2007;Zaslove 2004), welfare policies (e.g. Ennser-Jedenastik 2018;, environmental policies (Forchtner and Lubarda 2022) or gender (Akkerman 2015), there are still gaps in our knowledge especially regarding their policy preferences in some specific sectors. One of these gaps is the focus of this paper, namely Western European PRRPs' positions on education policy (but see: Giudici 2021).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

We don’t need no education? Education policies of Western European populist radical right parties

Berg

Jungblut

Jupskås

2023

West European Politics

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Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have become more mainstream, increasing their relevance in European politics. While a lot is already known about them, there are still gaps in our knowledge. This paper addresses one such gap by studying Western European PRRPs' positions on education policy. It focuses on the salience of education in election manifestos, substantive positions that parties hold, and in how far these positions reflect their core ideology. Constructing a novel framework based on core ideologies and three dimensions of education policies, including an often-neglected content dimension, the paper presents results from a qualitative content analysis of 15 manifestos. The results show that education policy is relevant for PRRPs, albeit to varying degrees, and that their policies are informed by their core ideologies. The findings have important implications for understanding education policy dynamics in liberal democracies as PRRPs fundamentally challenge normative foundations of Western European education systems.

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Scepticisms and beyond? A comprehensive portrait of climate change communication by the far right in the European Parliament

Cited by 26 publications

References 42 publications

Framing Climate Policy Ambition in the European Parliament

Framing Climate Policy Ambition in the European Parliament

Climate nationalisms: Beyond the binaries of good and bad nationalism

We don’t need no education? Education policies of Western European populist radical right parties

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