SCARE of the DES

Daudigny, Rémy; Ledig, Hervé; Muller, Frédéric; Valette, Frédéric

doi:10.1007/11496137_27

Cited by 27 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…This work was subsequently improved by Clavier [10] who described how to recover both s-boxes altogether with the secret key used by the cipher. In parallel to these results, Daudigny et al [13] showed that simple secret modifications of the DES cipher could also be recovered from side-channel observations. In a more recent work, Réal et al [27] took a closer look at Feistel schemes in a more general sense.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 48%

SCARE of Secret Ciphers with SPN Structures

Rivain

Roche

2013

Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2013

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Abstract. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) is commonly used to recover secret keys involved in the implementation of publicly known cryptographic algorithms. On the other hand, Side-Channel Analysis for Reverse Engineering (SCARE) considers an adversary who aims at recovering the secret design of some cryptographic algorithm from its implementation. Most of previously published SCARE attacks enable the recovery of some secret parts of a cipher design -e.g. the substitution box(es)-assuming that the rest of the cipher is known. Moreover, these attacks are often based on idealized leakage assumption where the adversary recovers noise-free side-channel information. In this paper, we address these limitations and describe a generic SCARE attack that can recover the full secret design of any iterated block cipher with common structure. Specifically we consider the family of SubstitutionPermutation Networks with either a classical structure (as the AES) or with a Feistel structure. Based on a simple and usual assumption on the side-channel leakage we show how to recover all parts of the design of such ciphers. We then relax our assumption and describe a practical SCARE attack that deals with noisy side-channel leakages.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 48%

SCARE of Secret Ciphers with SPN Structures

Rivain

Roche

2013

Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2013

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“…These results were improved by [10]. [11] studies DES in this context and is extended to Unknown Hardware Feistel Implementation by [12]. Use of proprietary algorithms and the protection of their specifications can be conceived in organizations that can afford the risk of relying on secret algorithms such as military groups or pay-tv / mobile network operators.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 86%

Protecting the NOEKEON Cipher against SCARE Attacks in FPGAs by Using Dynamic Implementations

Bringer¹,

Chabanne

Danger

2009

2009 International Conference on Reconfigurable Computing and FPGAs

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Protecting an implementation against Side Channel Analysis for Reverse Engineering (SCARE) attacks is a great challenge and we address this challenge by presenting a first proof of concept. White-box cryptography has been developed to protect programs against an adversary who has full access to their software implementation. It has also been suggested as a countermeasure against side channel attacks and we examine here these techniques in the wider perspective of SCARE. We consider that the adversary has only access to the cryptographic device through its side channels and his goal is to recover the specifications of the algorithm. In this work, we focus on FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate Array) technologies and examine how to thwart SCARE attacks by implementing a block cipher following white-box techniques. The proposed principle is based on changing dynamically the implementations. It is illustrated by an example on the Noekeon cipher and feasibility in different FPGAs is studied.

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“…The existing reverse engineering methods mainly include the mathematics‐based reverse analyses and SCA‐based reverse analyses . Invasive attack is another reverse analysis which reconfigures the logic circuits through different pairs of input and output.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Roman Novak firstly proposed a power analysis to recover the unknown S ‐box in A3/A8 algorithm , which is considered as the first work in SCARE. After several years, there have been more SCAREs against other algorithms at both hardware and software levels . In 2010, Sylvain Guilley proposed a new SCA, which is claimed to reverse any kind of algorithms .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Power analysis based reverse engineering on the secret round function of block ciphers

Tang

Qiu

et al. 2013

Concurrency and Computation

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SUMMARYThe recent cryptanalysis on block ciphers has two major trends. Side channel analysis (SCA) has become a new threat to the hardware implementations of encryption algorithms. On the other hand, reverse engineering has been adopted to explore the unknown part of the encryption algorithms, which has become a new target of the cryptanalysis. Some drawbacks have been found in the existing methods of reverse engineering, which target on the special structures or utilize the flaws in the unknown parts. The major disadvantage is that the number of rounds to be analyzed is limited, and the complexity is high. The existing SCAs for reverse engineering depend on the leakage models in a large extent and mainly focus on the single component of the algorithms, whereas the other parts of the target algorithm are known. In this paper, we present a more general and feasible reverse analysis by combining the mathematical methods and the SCA methods. We use the strict avalanche criterion for the non-linear operations of block ciphers and apply the power analysis to reverse the structure parameters. We propose a new reverse analysis method to reduce the dependency on the leakage models, which can be combined with the structural cryptanalysis to reverse the internal parameters of the linear and non-linear operations. We finally achieve the reverse analysis on the unknown round function of block ciphers.

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SCARE of the DES

Cited by 27 publications

References 9 publications

SCARE of Secret Ciphers with SPN Structures

SCARE of Secret Ciphers with SPN Structures

Protecting the NOEKEON Cipher against SCARE Attacks in FPGAs by Using Dynamic Implementations

Power analysis based reverse engineering on the secret round function of block ciphers

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