Saying “Yes,”“No,” and “Load Me Up” to Guns in America

Abstract

Debate over gun control and gun rights has energized but not explained the seesaw nature of national gun policy making. Punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) aids in understanding that process, the gun policies it produces, and the roles of the ideologically opposed coalitions that are their sources. Gun ownership remains closely related to public preferences about gun policy, and the size of the gun-owning population has begun to diminish. In this analysis, the authors find that rifle and shotgun ownership responded little to national policy changes, but handgun ownership responded to both secular and policy influences. The results are that more Americans than ever before are saying "no" to gun ownership. Fewer are saying "yes," but those who do own guns have been saying "load me up." PET provides a framework for analyzing these changes and for anticipating some of their implications for public administrators.The policy debate over gun rights and gun control is one of conflicting government policies and ideological extremes. Powerful ideologies and emotional images have energized but not explained the delayed and seesaw nature of national policy making about guns in America, and there are open questions about what effects those policies have had. For a better explanation, we turn first to a theory of policy making that focuses on policy images, mobilized interests, U.S. political institutions, and their complex interactions. We next empirically explore how those policies have and have not affected gun ownership over the years.We summarize the conflicting national gun policies in America and use punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) to explain them. We next examine the ideological extremes that energize the gun control and gun rights debate and relate them to gun ownership and policy preferences. In America, the population numbers and financial resources that interest groups can command influence the kinds of policy that are adopted. The size of the gun-owning population can therefore be an important factor in U.S. gun policy, and the size of that population is diminishing. These theoretical and empirical elements are combined to provide a view of changes in gun AUTHORS' NOTE: The authors are grateful for research support from the Jack Brooks Chair

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