Saving Positive Freedom

Abstract

In this article, I respond to Eric Nelson’s claim (in “Liberty: One Concept Too Many?”) that the most prominent versions of a positive concept of freedom all reduce to negative notions. I argue that in his otherwise scholarly and well-argued article, Nelson confuses a conceptual dispute with a normative one based on moral or political principle. Further, I point out that the traditional critique of positive conceptions of liberty, which rests on skepticism about perfectionist conceptions of political value, is lost if we see the debate in the way Nelson lays it out. When these issues are disentangled, I suggest that there is indeed conceptual space for uniquely “positive” conceptions of freedom, and I suggest that the idea of “autonomy” can be taken for such a notion and indeed represents a value worth taking seriously in current discussions of justice.

Qualitative Freedom

“…Or is one not forced to switch to a logic that can qualitatively differentiate between the formative conditions of subjective preferences (for example, as helping or hindering autonomy). 107 That at least is the argument of the American philosopher, Joseph Raz, who evaluates freedom according to its contribution to the development of reasonable selfdetermination. 108 Against the assumption of a normatively empty world -prevailing in quantitative models of freedom -into which our choices alone first inscribe values, Raz proposes that the "ability to respond appropriately to (perceived) normative aspects of the world" essentially belongs to freedom.…”

“…Whereas the model of quantitative freedom arises from a freedom appealing to independence and indifference, which can isolate itself from social, moral, or religious commitments at discretion, 114 from the perspective of qualitative freedom, autonomy can also be spotted in dependent as well as interdependent lifecircumstances. 115 That makes a huge practical difference.…”

Autonomy's Substance

“…The very meaning of constraint presupposes a range of normal (and perhaps morally valued) action types that humans are thought to pursue. 36 Something similar holds true of procedures too. It might be often overlooked, but procedures contain (at least implicitly) normative substance.…”

Un nuevo adversario de la libertad como no-dominación

“…Si las preferencias no son el resultado de manipulación, ignorancia o cualquier otro tipo de presión, entonces el individuo es libre sea cuál sea su contenido. Promover la libertad entendida de este modo no conduce a las consequencias intrusivas que Berlin tenía en mente (Christman 1991(Christman , 2005 obras Pettit la caracteriza como ausencia de poder incontrolado. El elemento que tienen en común la libertad positiva de Berlin y la libertad como no-dominación queda así patente.…”